

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1409899-0

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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C. W. Bates

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Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO: Mr. E. S. Miller *EMI*

DATE: 5/26/72

FROM: A. J. Decker *AD*

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. F. X. O'Neill

SUBJECT: MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP
ON PROTECTION AGAINST
TERRORISM IN THE U.S.

3/20/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY 8160 DD
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 (1)(2)
DATE OF REVIEW 9/26/92

Purpose of this memorandum is to apprise you of
matters discussed at the meeting of captioned group at
State Department Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 10 A⁺ Referral/Direct
9/26/72.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Enclosures CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-02-2030 24 19/4

FXON:mlr

(6)
ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ON BULKY NAME

CLASSIFIED BY 148280
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

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
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JUL 31 1974

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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Meeting of Interagency Group
on Protection Against
Terrorism in the U.S.

Referral/Direct







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Referral/Direct



Referral/Direct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Meeting of Interagency Group
on Protection Against
Terrorism in the U.S.

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Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

[Redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

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(C)

[Redacted] had no knowledge of such program. I told
that I would advise him at the next meeting
exactly what this program entailed and furnish to him the
representative countries. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[Redacted]

The meeting was terminated at approximately 11:50 AM. Another meeting was scheduled for Thursday,
9/28/72, at 10:30 AM.

Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

[Redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

Referral/Direct

ACTION:

For your information.

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Serial X



62-HQ-115360-EX

BULKY

4-331 (Rev. 8-28-73)

62-115360-X
BULKY ENCLOSURE
BIN # 15-C/604

XEROX COPY OF COVER LETTER ENCLOSED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-02-2005 BY auc tam/mlt/elh

CABINET COMMITTEE
TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

NOTES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-16-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

62-115360-X

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 02-28-2032

DATE: 05-16-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 05-16-2030

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

L. PATRICK GRAY, III
ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CAUTION: INFORMATION CLASSIFIED UP TO AND
INCLUDING "~~TOP~~ SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINA-
TION" HAS BEEN INCORPORATED HEREIN. IT IS
NOTED THAT EACH OF THE DESIGNATED MEMBERS
OF THE CABINET COMMITTEE HAS THE NECESSARY
CLEARANCE FOR THE MATERIAL USED. ADDI-
TIONALLY, MATERIAL INTERNALLY DESIGNATED
AS "JUNE" HAS BEEN USED AND SHOULD BE
AFFORDED APPROPRIATE PROTECTION.

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3-14-73

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Establishment of Committee

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Establishment of Committee

On September 25, 1972, the President, in a memorandum for the Secretary of State (Appendix A) on the subject of "Action to Combat Terrorism," stated that in line with the great importance and urgency which he attached to the problem of dealing with terrorism, he was establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The Committee, to be chaired by the Secretary of State, would be composed of the following members:

- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Attorney General
- The Secretary of Transportation
- The United States Ambassador
to the United Nations
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
- The Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs
- The Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

The President also directed that the Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State. The purpose of the Committee will be to consider the most effective means by which terrorism could be prevented both in the United States and abroad. Additionally, it will take the lead in establishing procedures to insure that the United States Government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively. The Secretary of State was directed to be in touch with other Governments and international organizations to effect the goal. Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies will cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under the President's directive, and they were ordered to comply with policies, guidelines, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee.

9/28/72

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The President specifically noted that the Cabinet Committee will:

1. Coordinate, among Government agencies, ongoing activities for the prevention of terrorism. Activities to be included will be the collection of intelligence world-wide and the physical protection of United States personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats and diplomatic installations in the United States.

2. Evaluate all such programs and activities and, where necessary, recommend methods for their effective implementation.

3. Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur.

4. Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs.

5. Report to the President from time to time concerning the foregoing.

The first meeting of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism is scheduled for 10:30 a.m., October 2, 1972.

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Interagency Group on Protection Against Terrorism
in the United States

In his memorandum of September 25, 1972, the President specifically noted that the two committees previously set up by the Secretary of State to cope with the problem of terrorism had been making commendable progress toward thwarting acts of terrorism in the United States and abroad. By Memorandum for the President dated September 18, 1972 (Appendix B), the Secretary of State noted that he established two special committees in the Department of State to stimulate and coordinate international and domestic action against terrorism. The international coordinate body was chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco. The domestic coordinate body was chaired by Acting Deputy Undersecretary of State Donelan. The coordinate bodies were established following the September 5, 1972, assassinations of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists in Munich, Germany. The FBI is represented on the domestic committee, hereinafter to be called Interagency Group on Protection Against Terrorism in the United States.

The committee has met on four occasions, September 13, 18, 21, and 26, 1972. The following agencies have been represented at at least one of the meetings:

Department of State (USDS) (Permanent Chairman)
Secret Service
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
Bureau of Customs
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
FBI

At the initial meeting with the group, the FBI representative outlined the FBI's jurisdiction and responsibility regarding terrorist acts in the United States. It was stated that the FBI is giving priority attention to these matters and that we have been taking positive steps to deter such activities by the terrorists. It was pointed out that the most serious problem facing the nation today regarding terrorism is the ease by which Arab terrorists can come into the country, either under their own or under false documentation. Specifically, it was emphasized that the plots which had been aborted in the previous six months had all been planned by foreign-based terrorists who entered the U. S. bearing false documentation. Also stressed was the need for intensified

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security checks of visa applications, not only from the Middle East but from third countries where the background of the applicant was not known. In another such meeting, the problem presented by the student segment of Arab visitors to the United States was also stressed.

The following affirmative steps have been taken by the United States Government as a direct result of discussions entered into at the committee meetings:

1. Pursuant to the point raised by the FBI concerning the ease by which Arab visitors to the U. S. could enter the U. S., [redacted]

Referral/Direct

2. At FBI's request, [redacted]

3. Pursuant to the previously voiced concern of t FBI relative to the large number of Arab students in the United States, [redacted]

Referral/Direct

4. After considering the danger posed by the practice of allowing visitors transiting the U. S. while en route to third countries to enter the U. S. without visas, on September 26, 1972, USDS suspended transit without visa privileges, effective September 27, 1972, through January 1, 1973. Thus, no transit without visa privileges will be extended to anyone transiting the U. S. en route to a third country. This closes previous loophole in USDS visa system which allowed Arabs, among others, to enter the U. S. without visas for temporary stays en route to third countries. Exception has been made for nationals of Canada and Mexico.

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5. In view of the fact that the FBI has no protective responsibilities for foreign diplomatic establishments in the U. S. and in view of our doubts as to the legal and policy problems involved, by letter dated September 21, 1972, from Mr. Gray, the Attorney General's attention was invited to the fact that assuming that the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate such takeovers, conferred under Title 18, Section 112, United States Code, the FBI was in doubt as to its authority to enter diplomatic premises or to make arrests within them. The Attorney General was queried as to whether, as a matter of policy, the FBI should investigate such takeovers or actually enter diplomatic premises occupied by representatives of another country where the FBI would normally be excluded from investigation due to the extraterritorial status of the premises.

In a memorandum dated September 29, 1972, Mr. Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, replied to Mr. Gray's query as follows:

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The entire text of Mr. Petersen's reply is set out as tab "G."

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In this regard there is also set out as tab "H" a copy of H.R. 15883, legislation described as an "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." The Act was passed by Congress on October 13, 1972, and the President is scheduled to announce the signing of the law on October 26, 1972.

It is recognized that many other possible violations of Federal statutes might occur in the event of a terrorist takeover of a diplomatic establishment in Washington, D.C. However, the following statutes are considered among the most likely to be violated:

Assaulting or Killing Foreign Personnel	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 112
Conspiracy	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 371
Extortion	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 875, 876, 877
Kidnapping	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 1201, 1202

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Action Prior to 9/5/72

ACTION TAKEN BY FBI PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 5, 1972,
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

International terrorism of recent years, spawned by political turmoil in the Middle East, is manifested in the United States by activities of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) and pro-Arab organizations. We recognized immediately the threat of such activities to the internal security and took appropriate measures to counteract them.

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9/28/72

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JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL)

JDL, formed in New York City in 1968 by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane as a self-defense group ostensibly for the protection of Jewish merchants and residents from the racial violence of black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, is the most aggressive of the militant Jewish organizations operating in the United States. JDL has been under investigation by the FBI since shortly after it was organized.

JDL has been the focal point of numerous acts of terrorism and violence aimed primarily against Soviet establishments, personnel, and cultural exhibits in the United States. During the past year, JDL broadened its sphere of harassment to include other foreign establishments in the United States, such as Arab interests, which it considers to be aligned with or aiding the enemies of Jews. Top United States Government officials have demanded a "strong Federal presence" in neutralizing JDL terroristic actions. In June, 1972, four JDL members were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in New York City for their participation in two separate fire bombings which occurred in New York City in January, 1972, and which were intensively investigated by the FBI. One of these fire bombings resulted in a homicide, several injuries, and extensive property damage. Pre-trial hearings in that matter are currently in progress in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. The State of New York contemplates prosecuting the homicide aspect involved. FGJ's were also convened in New York City and in Los Angeles during May and June, 1972, for the purpose of looking into JDL. In this connection, Special Agents of our New York and Los Angeles Offices served subpoenas on numerous JDL members, and also conducted a penetrative interview program of these JDL members. Information developed from our investigations of JDL and its leaders and members has been promptly disseminated to all interested agencies.

In late August, 1972, Rabbi Kahane, International Director of JDL, announced at a press conference in Israel that JDL in the United States would kidnap and hold for ransom Soviet diplomats if the Soviet Union did not abandon its taxation of Jewish intellectuals who desired to emigrate from Russia to Israel. On Bureau instructions, Kahane was penetratively interviewed by our Legal Attache in Tel Aviv in conjunction with representatives of the Department of State.

Kahane is awaiting prosecution in Israel in connection with a JDL plot to smuggle weapons out of Israel for use against Arab terrorists in Europe and the United States. This matter is

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

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JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL) (CONTINUED)

also receiving intensive investigation by our New York Office. Close coordination is also maintained with Kahane's U.S. Probation Officer, New York City, who is endeavoring to have his Federal Probation revoked for violation of the Gun Control Act concerning which in July, 1971, he was sentenced to five years probation and fined the sum of \$5,000.

On September 5, 1972, when it was reported that one member of the Israeli Olympic delegation was murdered by an Arab terrorist group in Munich, Germany, and in anticipation of additional violence, a teletype was dispatched to all Special Agents in Charge and Legal Attaches with instruction to target our sources to obtain additional information concerning contemplated reprisals by JDL against Arab interests.

Following the murders of the 11 Jewish Olympians in Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, JDL, Los Angeles, publicly announced it would retaliate against Arab terrorists in the United States. The Los Angeles Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) conducted surveillances of JDL members in Los Angeles. Subsequently, on September 12, 1972, the residence of an Arab in Los Angeles was bombed, resulting in property damage but no injuries. This bombing is under intensive investigation by our Los Angeles Office since it is believed to have been perpetrated by a terrorist group, JDL. Results of our investigation are immediately furnished upon receipt to the Internal Security Division of the Department.

By letter dated September 15, 1972, we requested the Attorney General to restate the delineation of the separate jurisdictions of the FBI and ATF insofar as bombings and attempted bombings by terrorist groups, such as JDL, are concerned. This matter is being followed with the Internal Security Division of the Department.

JDL has publicly announced its support of the Government of Israel regarding shooting down of a Libyan commercial airliner by Israeli aircraft on February 21, 1973, by counter-demonstrating in various U.S. locations against pro-Arab groups.

National membership of JDL is estimated to be 8 to 10 thousand.

The handling of the Bureau's investigation of JDL is receiving preferred supervision both at Headquarters and in the field.

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Based upon the foregoing developments

we took the following action.

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By teletype dated February 4, 1972, to selected SACs,
we instructed [REDACTED]

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Bureau airtel to all SACs dated June 9, 1972,
instituted [REDACTED] investigations of all members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab
terrorist organization which took credit for the massacre at
Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 30, 1972.

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10/17/72

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Seizure of the Israeli Embassy
in Bangkok

On December 28, 1972, four members of the Black September Organization (BSO) entered and seized control of the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, taking as hostages six Israelis, five members of the Embassy staff, and the visiting Israeli Ambassador to Cambodia. In return for release of the hostages, the captors demanded the freeing of 36 terrorists imprisoned in Israel. Instead, after 18 hours of negotiation with Thai authorities, the terrorists agreed to release the hostages in exchange for their own safe passage to Cairo.

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Murder of Ambassador and
Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM), U.S. Embassy, Khartoum,
Sudan, March 2-3, 1973

Black September Organization (BSO) terrorists on March 2, 1973, invaded the Embassy residence of Saudi Arabia in Khartoum where a reception was being held. They forcibly held as hostages U.S. Ambassador Noel, DCM Moore, the Saudi Ambassador, members of his family, and the Jordanian and Belgian Charges. East European and other Arab Ambassador guests were released as was the Spanish Charge.

In return for freeing the hostages, the terrorists demanded the release of prisoners being held by Jordan and Israel and the release of Sirhan Sirhan, the assassin of U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy. A leaflet distributed by the terrorists to released guests demanded action within 24 hours of the beginning of the siege and named the U.S. Embassy, Khartoum, specifically as being behind efforts to stop the "Black September Revolution" and as aiding Israelis.

The deadline was extended several times during negotiation of the demands. Some of the more extreme demands such as the release of Sirhan Sirhan were dropped but release of a number of prisoners held in Jordan remained constant. A "final" deadline of 8 p.m., March 3, 1973, was set by the terrorists. Prior to that time, the U.S. had adopted the position that it would not submit to blackmail or pay ransom.

Shortly after 9 p.m., March 3, 1973, a number of shots were fired inside the Saudi residence. It was later determined that Ambassador Noel, DCM Moore, and the Belgian Charge had been executed.

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3/13/73

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ACTION TAKEN BY FBI FOLLOWING ASSASSINATIONS
OF ISRAELI ATHLETES (SEPTEMBER 5, 1972)

Immediately upon learning of the assassinations of Israeli athletes in Munich, West Germany, all Legats and SACs were alerted and instructed that all sources and informants be targeted against any contemplated terrorist activities. All known or suspected Arab terrorist organizations and individuals in the United States were to be included in the coverage to be afforded. Additionally, all Legal Attaches were advised to contact their foreign police and intelligence agency sources to make certain that we would be immediately advised of any information coming to their attention concerning possible terrorist activities aimed at the United States.

On September 13, 1972, a representative of The White House advised that the President would direct a letter to the Attorney General setting forth the President's interest in terrorist activities, particularly concerning official visits to the United States. On September 15, 1972, a teletype was directed to all SACs setting out the President's concern for the safety of visiting foreign dignitaries, officials and groups, and his desire that adequate security measures be taken. Previously established instructions were reiterated providing that upon notification of a foreign official visitor's intent to visit the office territory, appropriate local police authorities are to be alerted. Additionally, appropriate sources are to be also alerted and requested to promptly report any information indicating planned demonstrations, harassment, physical harm, or embarrassment to the visitor or members of his party. Upon receipt of such information, the field should immediately notify the Bureau, appropriate local authorities, and the security officer accompanying the visitor of any information relating to the protection of the visitor or his group.

Action After 9/5/72


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There follows, under topical headings, specific
action taken by the FBI to meet problems posed by events



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It may be noted that [redacted] above, has departed the U. S. and has been denied a visa to reenter this country. However, his wife, [redacted] has been granted a visa to return and will [redacted]

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Referral/Direct

- 14 -
10/10/72

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Interviews of Potential Terrorists

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Interviews-Pot. Terr.

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By teletype dated 10/4/72, we have alerted all our offices of the attempts by "The New York Times" to set up situations whereby our Agents will be observed and photographed in connection with our investigations of Arab terrorists. Instructions were given to immediately alert all Agents to this situation and to advise the Bureau if any reporters made any contact with our offices for information concerning our investigations of Arabs. It was instructed further that should any such inquiries be received, they were to be answered by "no comment."

We are furnishing results of interviews to interested Government agencies, particularly to Immigration and Naturalization Service when persons interviewed are aliens.

In view of the Black September Organization (BSO) massacre of the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission in Khartoum, Sudan, March 3, 1973, (See page 10e), and indications that BSO planned additional operations "somewhere abroad" we instructed all SACs by teletype dated March 6, 1973, to immediately reinterview all known or reported Fatah members (they were interviewed twice previously). The purpose of the reinterviews is to deter any contemplated terrorist act in the U.S. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Upon receipt of information from [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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In addition to the above, contact was made with

[Redacted]

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Referral/Direct

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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On September 28, 1972, our Legal Attache in Beirut advised that [REDACTED] has not been seen in Beirut since September 19, 1972.

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Referral/Direct

We contacted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On October 27, 1972, we received information from our

Legat [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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We have furnished present location of [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED] to all our offices, to interested Legal Attaches, and to Department of State, INS, Secret Service, and to the Internal Security Division. We are continuing existing stops in order to be forewarned should [REDACTED] attempt to enter the U. S. in the future.

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10/27/72

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On 10/1/72, [] was interviewed by our Washington Field Office. [] advised he is a Jordanian citizen, the holder of a Jordanian passport, and is presently employed in the [] Washington, D. C. In connection with his employment, he travels throughout the U. S. appearing before various Arab student forums or other forums where the Palestinian question is of interest.

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[] categorically denied any personal involvement with Arab terrorist groups and/or activity. He added that he does not support or condone such activity, feeling it negates any sane solution to the Middle East question generally or to the Palestine question in particular. [] insisted that AIC national headquarters in New York, New York, and its various chapters in the U. S. file regular reports with the U. S. Department of Justice, identifying its mission and personnel within the U. S.

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and that AIC activity in no way relates to Arab terrorist activity of whatever origin. He added that many AIC employees throughout the United States feel, since the "Munich massacres," they have been subject to harassment by the U. S. Government through its intelligence agencies. He further said that it has been considered by the various AIC chapters to formally protest such investigative activity through their collective Ambassadors accredited to the United States. He stated he felt the current interview was beneficial in that it permitted him expression of his side of the story and an opportunity to refute "lies" against him.

[redacted] stated he visited the Embassy of Israel within the recent past to request issuance of a visa to allow his entry to Israel to rejoin his wife and fulfill a teaching contract in the occupied West Bank. Subsequent to this visit, he has had the feeling he has been followed by the "Israelis" or by representatives of the U. S. Government. [redacted] explained that his presence in Israel has been cleared by mutual friends in the military government and he fully expects the Embassy of Israel will issue him a visa within the next two days. On its receipt, [redacted] intends to expeditiously exit the United States, rejoin his wife, and undertake his teaching position. [redacted] stated that if he is suspected of terrorist activity, or support, by the Israelis, then his life in Israel would be in great jeopardy. He evidenced and expressed great fear for his personal safety in the above context. It was firmly stated to [redacted] that any negotiation between him and the Israeli Government is a choice he alone must consider.

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During the morning of 10/4/72, [redacted] made contact with a Supervisor in Washington Field Office for an interview. The interview was scheduled for 12:30 p.m. the same day.

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During the interview of 10/4/72, [] denied membership and/or association with Al Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Black September Group, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He insisted his knowledge of such matters is based on public source information as contained in the daily press, or news periodicals. He stated that the FBI, or some other organization, such as the Jewish Defense League, has been following him and that within the past twenty-four hours he has been continuously followed. He added that if surveillance did not cease there would be a protest filed through Arab Ambassadors in the United States.

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[] that if "terrorist plans" ever came to his attention he would report such activity to proper authority. When asked for explanation he stated that acts of violence and/or terror which occur in the Middle East and are directed against Israelis are in reality acts of retaliation against Israeli usurpers of legitimate Arab territorial claims. He stated he sympathizes with Al Fatah programs and actions as they are directed against Israelis in the Middle East. He added he does not approve of terrorist acts such as the "Munich Massacre."

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[] he traveled to Chicago in the recent past to attend an Arab council meeting concerned with assisting Palestinian refugees. In the course of that meeting he met a [] described by him as a student in the Kansas City area, who expressed an interest in coming to Washington, D. C. to obtain employment. [] told [] he desired an appointment with the Ambassador from Qatar (Abdullah Saleh Al-Mania) to secure employment. [] added he and [] attended a diplomatic reception hosted by the Embassy of Qatar over the weekend of [] and that he introduced [] to Ambassador Al-Mania. [] additionally understood that [] was to have an appointment on [] with the Qatar Ambassador to further arrange his employment and that [] would be remaining in Washington, D. C. [] denied any knowledge of [] activity as it relates to Arab terrorist activity.

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[] then reiterated his plans for travel to the Middle East and the details surrounding his visits to the Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C.

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It was indicated to [] that he was being less than candid; that the information of him was reliable; that he knows about Al Fatah as it operates in the United States; and, that this Bureau would take every necessary action to frustrate terrorist

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- 19b -

10/5/72

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terrorist activity of any description. It was indicated to him that he and his known associates are free at anytime to initiate contact with the FBI such as he had done 10/4/72.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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10/5/72

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On October 11, 1972, [] was interviewed by one of our Agents relative to a fraudulent check case in which [] was victimized. During this interview, [] stated he would voluntarily depart the U.S. if he was unable to be released from jail by October 12, 1972.

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Referral/Direct

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10/12/72

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Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

On October 25, 1972, our Agents in Chicago observed [redacted] participating in a press conference concerning FBI harassment, after which he boarded TWA Flight 770, a non-stop flight to London. We have advised our Legal Attache in London, who will advise proper [redacted] (S)

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[Redacted] b7C

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[Redacted]

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Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Direct

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Letter Bomb Mailings

Letter Bomb Mailings

On September 19, 1972, an airmail letter was opened in the Israeli Embassy, London, England, and an explosive device was detonated in the face of the Agricultural Counselor, to whom the letter was addressed, fatally injuring him. Seven additional letters containing explosive devices were discovered in London and all of them were addressed to Israeli officials and employees of the Israeli Embassy in that city.

On September 20, 1972, three such letters were discovered in the mail stream of the U. S. Post Office, New York City. Since that time, in excess of 40 such devices have been discovered throughout the world. Receipt of these letter bombs has been noted in Montreal and Ottawa, Canada; Israel; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Australia; Brussels, Belgium; Paris, France; Geneva, Switzerland; Vienna, Austria; and Kinshasa, Zaire.

All letter bombs, as reported to us, were postmarked Amsterdam, The Netherlands, on September 18, 1972, and have been sent by airmail in envelopes varying from red-bordered airmail type envelopes to plain white envelopes to multi-colored envelopes.

United States authorities are naturally primarily concerned with the three letter bombs received in New York City which were addressed to Israelis assigned to that country's delegation to the United Nations. Statutory jurisdiction lies with the U. S. Postal Service, and the Bureau is pursuing this matter from an intelligence standpoint bearing in mind the possible international conspiracy angle. We have offered and are affording all possible cooperation to the U. S. Postal Service including not only our Laboratory facilities but the facilities of our Legal Attaches (Legats) abroad. The majority of all information has been developed for us by our Legats and has been furnished to the U. S. Postal Service as well as to the entire intelligence community in this country.

On September 20, 1972, we directed all Special Agents in Charge and all Legats to immediately contact logical sources and informants as well as official agencies overseas to obtain all available information concerning receipt of letter bombs. We have periodically since then instructed specific Legats and the New York Office, where bombs have been discovered, to

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develop evidentiary-type information concerning the explosive itself with leads to obtain evidence concerning where the explosive and mechanical parts of the device were manufactured, obtained, and by whom. We have noted our particular interest in photographs of the explosive devices which have been disarmed and latent fingerprints.

The New York City Police Department (NYCPD) deactivated one of the bombs received in New York City and photographs of this explosive device and the three envelopes discovered in New York City are attached in the appendix (Appendix D). Through the cooperation of the U. S. Postal Service, we are having made available to us, by the U. S. Army, access to the two letter bombs remaining with the NYCPD. The U. S. Army, at its Indian Head, Maryland, facility, will deactivate the remaining two devices and efforts will be made by our Laboratory representatives to obtain latent fingerprints from the contents of the envelopes. Other Laboratory examinations will be conducted.

There follows a description of the explosive device disarmed by the NYCPD Bomb Squad:

The envelope after being opened revealed a packet wrapped in light pink tissue paper. Upon removal of the tissue paper, a folded cardboard packet was revealed. The explosive device was contained in this folded cardboard packet. When laid out flat, the piece of cardboard measured approximately 6 inches by 7½ inches with the explosive device glued to half of the cardboard and the other half folded over. The top of the opened end was glued together. Upon opening the cardboard, the trigger mechanism was activated enabling the bomb to explode. The explosive device consisted of the firing mechanism pasted on to the cardboard with the explosive charge also pasted to the cardboard and surrounding the firing mechanism. The composition of the explosive was that of putty which was sandwiched between two sheets of crepe paper which, in turn, was glued to the cardboard. The firing mechanism had a spring-loaded mousetrap type device which, when allowed to flip up, released a spring-loaded plunger which fired a rifle primer and, in turn, set off a nonelectric blasting cap. The triggering mechanism was contained in a brass colored oblong cylinder approximately 1½ inches in length. The cylinder itself appeared to be a machined device possibly used in some type of military ordnance and the blasting cap had been flattened into an oblong shape to match the cylinder.

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Those other devices received throughout the world, as reported to us, appeared to be similar in appearance and nature. Envelopes in which the various devices have been received have varied from 6 inches by 3 inches to 8 inches by 3½ inches. The explosive has been identified as RDX/PETN which has been described as readily available on the world market. Also, envelopes opened have contained a printed message from the "Black September" (Al Fatah) organization, indicating it is responsible for the mailing.



On September 27, 1972, the U. S. Postal Service telephonically advised that it had received a photograph of a latent fingerprint located on one of the envelopes recovered in England. This photograph is being made available to us. We will immediately obtain available fingerprints of known Al Fatah members in this country and elsewhere, as deemed necessary, for comparison purposes.



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This information has been furnished by us to The White House, U. S. Postal Service, the Attorney General, and other agencies in the U. S. intelligence community.



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On October 5, 1972, [redacted] advised the Legal Attache in Rome that on October 4, 1972, a letter bomb was received at the offices of United Hias Service, the Jewish assistance organization. The Hias employee receiving the letter became suspicious because the envelope did not bear a Rome postmark and was not addressed by hand or typewriter but bore a Hias address clipped from a leaflet published by Hias. The envelope bears Malaysian stamps and what appears to be Penang,

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Malaysia, postmarking. In the envelope was a folded cardboard bearing writing, "Black September," in Arabic and English. The cardboard bore two strips of plastic explosive material as well as an additional strip which apparently was to cause the explosion.

On October 6, 1972, a representative of the U.S. Postal Service advised that following delivery of a letter to Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization in America, 65 East 52nd Street, New York, New York, the Postal Inspectors were notified that individuals at the above organization were suspicious of its contents. The letter was returned to the Postal Service, X rayed and it was determined to contain an explosive device. The envelope was pink in color with red and blue airmail border and was about eight inches by three inches. It contained three Malaysian stamps and was postmarked September 30 1972 Penang Malaysia, with return address of [redacted]

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[redacted] After disarming, the device was scheduled to be delivered to the U.S. Postal Service Crime Laboratory.

On October 6, 1972, the [redacted] Police advised our Legal Attache at Bonn that on October 5, 1972, a letter bomb, containing an explosive device similar to those previously mailed from Amsterdam, had been received. The letter was addressed to Dr. Arnold Schustermann, Nelly Sach Haus Five, [redacted] The letter had been air mailed in Malaysia and bore the return address of [redacted] The Nelly Sach Haus is a Jewish home for the aged. Schustermann is deceased. The device was deactivated by the police.

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On October 10, 1972, the Postal Service, New York City, advised that at approximately 3:55 PM. the same date, [redacted] in Hadassah and in the New York area, returned an opened envelope which she had received in the mail on that date. The envelope contained a bomb of the same type as bombs previously sent from Amsterdam. The envelope contained the same message from the Black September Organization of Al Fatah. The only difference in the bomb was that it was not completely contained in cardboard as past bombs have been, but instead had only a strip of cardboard over the firing mechanism. The New York City Bomb Squad has advised that the firing mechanism had been activated either by [redacted] or during handling in the mails. It was their opinion that the firing pin did not hit the primer with enough force to fire it. It was stated that the explosive had the same appearance as in past bombs.

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The envelope was a bright yellow color, approximately 3½ inches by 6½ inches in size. In the upper left hand corner

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of the envelope was a dark blue airmail sticker which read "Mel Udara Par Avion." In the right hand corner were three stamps, two of which were green in color and of two dollar denomination. These two stamps had a picture of a butterfly on them. The other was a fifty cent stamp, pink in color with a picture of a yellow bird on it. Also on the front of the envelope was a white address sticker approximately 7/8 inches by 3 inches. The letter was addressed as follows: [redacted]

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[redacted] US of A. The US of A was underlined. The franking stamp indicated that the letter was mailed from Denano, Malaysia. The date was illegible. On the back of the envelope in longhand was the return address of [redacted]

[redacted] advised that she is acquainted with a [redacted] who is also active in the Zionist movement in the New York area and just recently returned from Africa where she was on a speaking tour.

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At 10:20 AM, October 14, 1972, the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) advised that there had been an explosion of unknown origin at the U.S. Post Office, Fordham Branch, 420 East 189th Street, Bronx, New York. Investigation at the scene disclosed that at 10:15 AM, [redacted]

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[redacted] had an envelope explode as he was examining the partially opened flap of a letter held by the Post Office as undeliverable. A rod of 2 1/2 inches in length by approximately 3/8 inches in diameter was projected by the force of the explosion into his left hand. [redacted] right little finger was mangled, and he has burns on both hands and forearms. He was taken to Fordham Hospital, Bronx, New York, in fair condition.

The above envelope was described as orange in color, weighing 6 to 8 ounces, approximately 6 by 10 inches, and postmarked in Malaysia. The letter was addressed to [redacted] [redacted] or [redacted] at her former address, [redacted]

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A representative of the NYCPD Bomb Squad advised that the explosive was an "Israeli type, Black September Group device." He stated a nonelectric plastic cap had been imbedded in a square of unknown explosive.

A Post Office Inspector advised on the same date that [redacted] is [redacted] the women's Zionist organization in America at New York and moved from [redacted] approximately two years ago. Current residence for [redacted] is [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that the name [redacted] no address, was utilized as a return address

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on an envelope containing an explosive device which was received last Tuesday (October 10, 1972) by a woman who is also an Honorary Vice President of Hadassah, but this device did not explode.

[redacted] advised they are working on the assumption that the individuals or group responsible for sending these explosive devices through the mail are using a New York directory that is over two years old, since [redacted] moved from her former Bronx address over two years ago.

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[redacted] The Legal Attache has reported that according to the American Embassy in Malaysia, there is a vast reservoir of sympathy in Malaysia for the Arab cause and the letter bomb matter is very tense.

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[redacted] stated he was

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[redacted] all the conferences held or to be held within the area for which he was responsible. A search of [redacted] luggage revealed a suitcase which contained the following:

- (a) 5 Hand grenades
- (b) 4 Blocks of high explosive weighing 2 kilograms each
- (c) 10 Detonators electrically operated
- (d) 10 Battery operated detonators
- (e) 1 Package of 8 letter bombs
- (f) 1 Package of 7 letter bombs
- (g) 1 Package of 5 letter bombs

(Items (e), (f), and (g) were ready to be sent except for adding the addresses and for securing the sheer wiring which had not yet been pulled out.)

- (h) 1 Letter bomb which appeared to be used as a sample

Another suitcase contained, among other things, five pistols and three boxes of ammunition.

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A diary found in an attache case listed a number of PLO and Fatah personnel worldwide. There was also a list of Israeli or Jewish persons whom [redacted] presumed were meant to receive the letter bombs. Included in the list were [redacted]

and [redacted]

[redacted] both New York City.

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On interview [redacted] claimed that the first suitcase was given to him in Damascus by [redacted] and was to be turned over to [redacted] Algerian Embassy, Buenos Aires. Based on the exit and entry stamps in [redacted] passport, [redacted] advised that [redacted] made a number of trips regularly every month from February, 1972, until August-September, 1972.

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[REDACTED]

With reference to the two names and addresses in New York City found in the possession of [REDACTED] investigation by our New York Office identified them as follows: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Jewish National Fund.
[REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] whose offices were located at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] until September, 1972. He is a [REDACTED]
resides in Jerusalem, but was visiting in the U. S. until mid-October, 1972. [REDACTED] reportedly intercepted a letter bomb directed to him in Jerusalem in early October, 1972.

Results of our investigation concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were disseminated to the President, State Department, CIA, military intelligence and other interested agencies. [REDACTED] was not known to [REDACTED] nor to an associate of [REDACTED]. Both advise the New York City addresses and names found in the possession of [REDACTED] would be readily available to Arab terrorists as they have appeared in various Jewish directories and publications. We advised [REDACTED] the associate of [REDACTED] U. S. Postal Service authorities, and the Special Investigation Section, New York City Police Department, as to the contents of [REDACTED] luggage confiscated by Dutch authorities in Amsterdam.

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On November 2, 1972, our Legal Attache in Brasilia reported that the [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was detained for questioning by [REDACTED] in Rio De Janeiro (and later in Brasilia) shortly after he returned to Brazil on October 26, 1972. To date, [REDACTED] has not been too responsive to questioning and his future status in Brazil is not clear. Questioning by the [REDACTED] is being directed toward establishing background data and clarification of [REDACTED] status in Brazil since original entry October 21, 1971, with an apparently valid diplomatic passport without accreditation by the Brazilian government and his activities in and travel within and to and from Brazil since October, 1971.

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Available data from [REDACTED] indicates that [REDACTED] was born in [REDACTED] in Jordan and is bearer of a diplomatic passport. He admits that he is a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but he has denied that he is an adherent of terrorism or violence. He has also denied that the suitcase with letter

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bombs, grenades and pistols was his. [] has claimed he traveled to the U. S. on only one occasion and that was during June, July, 1972, when he visited his sister, [] in a Belle Glade, Florida hospital. [] is married to [] (probably a cousin) and they reside at [], telephone []

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By teletype November 3, 1972, the Miami Office advised inquiry at Belle Glade, Florida, area hospitals failed to disclose that sister of [] had been a patient; however, [] on interview stated that [] was his cousin. [] the brother-in-law of [] advised he had been naturalized 1969, at Kansas City, Missouri, and then petitioned to have his brother [] and [] enter the U. S. [] entered the U. S. at New York City in the early part of 1971. Both [] denied knowledge of or participation in Arab terrorist activities.

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On interview, [] [] alien registration number [] advised she married [] a Jordanian, in her native village (El Mezaras, Jordan) in 1965, and then departed for the Canary Islands. She remained in the Canary Islands until entry into the U. S. on January 17, 1971, at New York City. [] stated she is a housewife, has had only one year of education and the mother of three sons, ages six, five and two. She identified her brothers as [] the eldest and residing in Brazil; [] located in or near Kuwait; and, [] the youngest. [] stated that she had not seen or talked to her brothers since her departure from Jordan in 1965. She also denied that she had recently been in a hospital for treatment of herself. She recalled that approximately two months ago her youngest child fell and she went to the Emergency Ward of the Belle Glade Hospital to have the child examined. [] denied any knowledge of or participation in terrorist activities.

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We are continuing our efforts to determine the possibility that [] may have engaged in any terrorist activity in the U. S. and particularly to resolve discrepancy

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between his statement that he visited his sister in Belle Glade in June, July, 1972, and her statement that she has seen none of her brothers since she left Jordan in 1965.

In connection with the Brazilian detention of

[] it is to be noted that on November 3, 1972.

[] advised our New Orleans Office that he was in receipt of information from sensitive and extremely reliable sources that unspecified terrorist activities would be directed against Brazilian diplomatic establishments and/or Brazilian officials in the United States in the near future. [] added that the possibility exists that terrorist activities would utilize the mails and he requested Postal Service be notified without disclosing the source. [] stated he had furnished the information to make it an official matter of record at the request of the Brazilian Government and in the name of the Brazilian Consul in New Orleans. He said that he was not free to divulge further information in view of possible diplomatic repercussions and in view of the nature of the sources involved.

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We have notified The White House and all other interested U. S. agencies including the Postal Service. Recontact will be made with [] for any available additional information he may gain from his sources.

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We have determined that [] entered the U. S. at Miami, Florida on June 24, 1972, bearing a B-2 visa issued at Rio De Janeiro on March 29, 1972. He departed for San Juan on July 4, 1972. Appropriate stop has been placed against his future entry into the U. S. with Central Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service. The State Department has taken steps to revoke [] visa.

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Our Legal Attache, Brasilia has advised that Brazilian authorities on November 3, 1972, released [] into the custody of the Algerian Ambassador in Brazil for departure to Algeria via Madrid on November 4, 1972.

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BOORUM & PEASE "NOTE"

Our Legat at Beirut reported the following information concerning two letter bombs which exploded there October 25, 1972. No one was killed, but two persons were injured seriously and may lose their sight. Both letter bombs were believed to have been mailed locally. One exploded at the main post office where it was being handled by a postal clerk. It was addressed to one [redacted] but the clerk could not recall the address. The other exploded when it was opened by a secretary at the Universal Trading Company, Gefinor Building Beirut. It was addressed to [redacted] a [redacted] who is of Palestinian origin and has been active in Fatah. We disseminated the information developed by our Legat to the White House, State Department, military intelligence, and other appropriate agencies.

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Our Legat at Tel Aviv reported the following information received October 25, 1972, from [redacted] concerning letter bombs addressed to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Secretary of State Rogers. The letter bombs were intercepted by Israeli postal employees, October 24, 1972, at a small village on the Lebanese border.

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Two letters had been deposited in one letter box and a third letter in another. The letters were described as similar to those which had been mailed from Amsterdam. Addresses were typed on labels with no return address used and Israeli postage was affixed to each. The letter bore the numbers 42, 43, and 47 respectively, but the significance of the numbers was not known. We immediately advised the White House, Defense Department, CIA and other interested agencies by teletype.

As of October 28, 1972, [redacted] investigation of the three letter bombs had developed no suspects. Worldwide press reports, however, linked them with the arrest of [redacted] a 20-year-old native born U. S. citizen. [redacted] advised, however, [redacted] had been arrested October 25, 1972, by an Israeli Defense Forces patrol when he attempted to cross the border into Lebanon. He was charged with a violation of the Israeli law "criminal infiltration."

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Investigation of the offense determined [redacted] had been residing with relatives in Jerusalem. Upon interview of them, [redacted] found a supply of envelopes belonging to [redacted] similar in type to those used in the letter bombs intercepted at the Israeli-Lebanese border. [redacted] advised on October 29, 1972, that [redacted] was still being detained for investigation of his attempt to cross the border and that circumstances of the violation in relation to the time and place of the interception of the letter bombs would require some investigation of him in relation to the letter bombs. [redacted] noted, however, that a latent fingerprint found on one of the letter bombs was determined not to be identical with [redacted] fingerprints. Later the [redacted] advised that it had been determined that [redacted] had nothing whatsoever to do with the letter bombs.

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BOORUM & PEASE "NOTE"

Results of our investigation concerning [redacted] including information furnished to our Legat by [redacted] was disseminated by teletype to the White House, State Department, CIA, military intelligence, and other interested agencies.

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On November 2, 1972, [redacted] Singapore furnished the following data to our Legal Attache [redacted]

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On October 30, 1972, two letter bombs were intercepted by Singapore Postal authorities. They were believed to have been posted October 29, 1972. Explosive experts found an explosive device wedged in between two thin cardboards and defused both. The letter bombs were addressed to Salisbury, Rhodesia, and Milan, Italy. Each letter bomb contained a reprisal note in English and Arabic. On October 30, 1972, another 13 letter bombs were intercepted and 11 of those were enclosed in pinkish airmail envelopes similar to the first two and the remaining two were enclosed in light blue and white envelopes. All 13 bombs were defused. Of these 13 three were addressed to New York as follows: [redacted]

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[redacted] and [redacted] and Messrs. American Israel Corporation, 30 East 42nd Street. Four were addressed to Italy, two to England, three to Australia and one to Israel.

Of the 15 letter bombs, noted above, 13 were enclosed in ordinary airmail envelopes. The remaining two were enclosed in envelopes with "Mel Udara" airmail stickers. "Mel Udara" stickers have not been used in Singapore since 1970 but are currently in use in Malaysia. All letters contained Singapore postmarks. The pinkish envelopes, which are high quality material, are not readily available in Singapore. Bomb experts believe the letter bombs could not have been improvised locally because of their sophistication.

On November 3, 1972, [redacted] advised our Legal Attache in London that a letter bomb had been received at M. S. British Technion Society, 83 Wimpole Street, London (British/Israeli Institute of Technology) on November 2, 1972. Two stamps of Singapore origin were used and the date stamp was Singapore October 23, 1972. The envelope contained an airmail official label color blue, and marked M & L Udara Par Avion." Name and address of the alleged sender on reverse side was [redacted]

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[redacted] The envelope was described as six and one-half inches by three and one-half inches, and bright orange in color. Inside the envelope was a piece of cardboard six and three-eighths by three and three-eighths inches on which tightly secured by one-inch wide cellophane were two strips of blotting type paper measuring approximately five by one inch with a layer of pale yellow colored substance believed to be explosive RDX/PETN positioned longitudinally approximately one-half inch in from each side leaving a gap of approximately three-eighths inch between each strip.

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In the three-eighths inch gap was positioned a brass square-shaped body approximately two and one-half inches long by one-fourth by one-fourth inch recessed at the top and fitted with a release lever of similar metal approximately three-fourths inch by three-sixteenths inch tapering down to a point. The lever was secured to the main body by a small metal pin. This sleeve housed an approximate two-inch spiral spring and a blunt-nosed metal copper/steel type or brass striker notched out at the top to receive the release pin. The detonator was approximately one and three-fourths inches long by one-half inch diameter which was partly flattened. This detonator case was copper, and pressed indicating possible squeezing by use of a vise. The above items were covered by a piece of cardboard measuring out three and one-half by one inch.

We have furnished information concerning the mailings of letter bombs above to The White House and all interested U. S. agencies. We are contacting the intended victims and apprising them of attempts to mail letter bombs to them.

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Additionally, our New York and Alexandria Special Agents are conducting appropriate immediate investigations at logical ports of entry to verify arrival of these individuals. Our Legal Attaches have been directed to determine if U. S. visas have been issued to these men.

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We have furnished the above to The White House, the Attorney General, and to all interested agencies in the U. S. intelligence community. Additionally, we have directed all our offices to alert appropriate local authorities and informants. We have also directed all our Legal Attaches to contact cooperative agencies to attempt to confirm the information.

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Referral/Direct

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
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We have alerted our offices having  establishments within their territories to target their sources to uncover any relevant activity.

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We immediately instructed our Chicago Office to debrief the source and to establish a command post at O'Hare and Midway Airports. The latter instruction was modified when it became apparent no terrorist attack against the airports was imminent.

Debriefing of the source determined [redacted] was the subject of his information. Intensive investigation of [redacted] determined he entered the United States with his wife and children [redacted] as a permanent residence alien, destined to her relatives in Takoma Park, Maryland. [redacted] deserted them after a month, went to Detroit and has resided in Chicago since November, 1972.

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Based upon source's statements as to subject's allegations concerning his involvement in Arab terrorist activity, we conferred with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and appropriate Assistant Attorneys General in the Department. It was the consensus of the latter that the facts warranted INS institution of deportation proceedings against [redacted] for his failure to notify INS of his change of address, usually considered a routine violation. The INS General Counsel has not rendered a decision in the matter to date.

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The [redacted] source is under our control and furnishes us information concerning [redacted] current activities. We have developed no corroboration of [redacted] involvement in Arab terrorist activity independent of his boasts to that effect, as reported by the source.

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Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

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Referral/Direct

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Referral/Direct

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Referral/Direct b6
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[redacted] arrived in the U.S. on November 10, 1972, and placed under 24-hour surveillance. Additionally, he was afforded special coverage while in California.

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VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN
TO THE U.S. 2/5-28/73

Prior to and during the visit of King Hussein of Jordan we investigated numerous reported plots against his life by Arab terrorists. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Our investigation identified the [redacted] as [redacted]. He was born [redacted] at [redacted] entered the U.S. at Miami as a permanent resident [redacted] and was naturalized at the U.S. District Court, Alexandria, Virginia, [redacted] His current residence was determined to be [redacted]

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When interviewed February 3, 1973, by Agents of our Alexandria Office, [redacted] denied any involvement in Al Fatah, BSO, or other terrorist groups. He denied knowledge of any Arab terrorist activity planned for the U.S. or elsewhere but volunteered that a nephew in the Middle East was probably an Al Fatah member.

Investigation did not substantiate [redacted] alleged involvement with any Arab terrorist group but did determine he had visited the Middle East in 1967 and 1971. When interviewed he stated he planned to return to Lebanon within a few weeks to visit relatives.

Investigation determined that during his residence in the Washington, D. C., area [redacted] has been employed as a part-time translator by the [redacted] and intermittently as an [redacted] located at the [redacted]

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Attempted Bombings of Three
Israeli Facilities, New York City,
March, 1973 (TRIBOM)

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TRIBOM

Intensive investigation was immediately begun and has continued to this date. A special team of Agents has been assigned to this matter both in New York and in Newark. All leads are being handled expeditiously. Investigations are being conducted by numerous field offices as well as by our Legats

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The three autos utilized in the attempted bombings were processed and several latent fingerprints developed along with physical evidence which is being examined by our laboratory. Among evidence found were three gallon "Jerry" cans and containers reflecting sender and recipient. Investigation of recipient and auto parts shop, New Jersey, determined that on February 28, 1973, a white male speaking broken English and nervous made inquiries concerning purchase of 10 five-gallon plastic utility cans. This individual purchased two cans and requested eight be ordered. He subsequently returned the same day to inquire about large propane tanks. At the same auto parts store, again on February 28, 1973, a young white male purchased a nine volt battery, a roll of black tape and a roll of stereo speaker wire.

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Investigation in this matter has determined that at least three individuals were involved in either the rental of the autos used for the placement of the bombs and the pick up of the cans and related material. Descriptions of these individuals were obtained and composite photographs were prepared by our laboratory. Numerous neighborhood investigations have been conducted in attempts to determine who might have seen the suspects leaving the autos in the various locations.

In regard to this investigation, it is interesting to note how a possible perpetrator of this act was uncovered.

In a case entitled (FNU) [redacted] an investigation was begun on January 19, 1973, based on receipt of information furnished to our Legat. Tel Aviv. [redacted]

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[redacted] after suitable background investigation, was interviewed in New York City at which time he advised he resided in Baghdad, Iraq, and that he was the son of [redacted]. [redacted] advised he was currently visiting in the U.S. in an effort to obtain flight training in civil aviation and that upon completion of such training planned to obtain employment as a commercial pilot in the Middle East.

[redacted] described himself as "non-political" and stated he desired to cooperate with U.S. authorities as it was his intention to abide with the laws of the U.S. since he was here as a visitor. A description was obtained of [redacted] during the interview. Investigation by our Newark Office determined that [redacted] had made contact with individuals at Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New Jersey, in anticipation of obtaining flying lessons. On February 26, 1973, [redacted] returned to Teterboro Airport to pick up a refund on a previous enrollment fee of \$100 made in anticipation of obtaining flying lessons. At that time, [redacted] indicated he planned to leave the U.S.

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
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Referral/Direct



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Information from Newark on March 12, 1973, determined that [redacted] stayed at the Mayflower Hotel in Newark from February 15 through March 3, 1973, and a search of the room indicated that pieces of wire and plastic tape were located therein. Intensive investigation is being conducted to identify all individuals with whom [redacted] was in contact.

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A check of the Central Office records, Immigration and Naturalization Service, revealed a copy of an arrival form I-94 regarding [redacted]. This individual was listed as having been born [redacted] (note previous information available indicates [redacted] was born [redacted] in [redacted] citizenship was given as Iraq with a permanent residence of [redacted]. The passport number for [redacted] was given as [redacted] and it was noted that he had been issued a U.S. visa at Beirut, Lebanon, on [redacted]. His stated U.S. address was given as "touring New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston". It is noted his pre-flight inspection took place at Montreal, Canada, on January 12, 1973, and he arrived at Boston, Massachusetts, on January 12, 1973, for a one month stay. He traveled to the U.S. aboard Delta Airlines flight number 625. No departure information was indicated.

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Investigation of [redacted] in this matter is being given highest priority attention.

Photographs of the contents of the three vehicles containing explosives in this matter are appended as Appendix "J".

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GLOSSARY

AL FATAH

Spelling, in reverse, of Arabic initials for Movement for the Liberation of Palestine (MFLP). Largest, best-financed, and most influential group in Fedayeen movement. Since the June, 1967, war, its name has become virtually synonymous with the movement. Representation of the Arab terrorist movement in the U. S. has become the almost exclusive responsibility of Al Fatah. Its headquarters are in Beirut, Lebanon. It advocates violence through assassination, hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, sabotage, and extortion.

ARAB INFORMATION CENTER

Headquarters in U. S. are at 405 Lexington Avenue, Suite 3711, New York City. Arab League is parent organization of Arab Information Centers throughout the world.

BLACK SEPTEMBER GROUP

An elite band formed within the Special Services force of Al Fatah and responsible for all its terrorist activities. The group was responsible for the atrocities at the Munich Olympics September 5, 1972; the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister in Cairo November, 1971; and the mailing of miniature explosive devices to Israeli diplomatic establishments in Europe and the U. S., one of which killed an Israeli diplomat in London September 19, 1972. The name of the group commemorates the September, 1971, "civil war" in Jordan during which government forces practically eliminated the Fedayeen presence.

BOULDER PROJECT

The name given to the systematic screening of names of Arabs throughout the world who apply for visas to the U. S. Records of CIA, FBI, INS, and Secret Service are checked to determine whether any information is available concerning the names.

DEMOCRATIC POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DPFLP)

A Middle East Arab guerrilla organization strongly Marxist-Leninist-oriented whose leader is an avowed follower of MAO Tse-tung.

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FEDAYEEN (literally, "those who sacrifice themselves") MOVEMENT

A generic term used to define Arab terrorism in general. The movement is rooted in the displacement from their "homeland" of some 2,000,000 - 2,500,000 Palestinian Arabs. Its objective is the "liberation of Palestine," achievement of which does not tolerate any political solution which includes recognition of continuing existence of the State of Israel.

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL)

Organized in 1968 by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane to protect Jewish merchants and residents in New York City Black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods plagued by racial violence. It has become the focal point for organized acts of terrorism and violence directed against Soviet and Arabic establishments and individuals in the U. S. by Jews.

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MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (MFLP)

Largest, best-financed, and most influential of groups clustered under Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its Arabic initials in reverse spell FATAH.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

A central umbrella-type organization under which the diverse factions of the Fedayeen movement are grouped and, to a degree, organized.



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UNITED HOLYLAND FUND

A Missouri corporation whose stated purpose is to collect funds for the relief and aid of Palestinian widows and orphans injured in the Arab-Israeli war. Reliable sources have reported funds collected are being used to purchase military arms for Arabs.



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POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
PALESTINE (PFLP)

An Arab terrorist organization founded in 1967 for the purpose of destroying Israel and all who support that country. Members are indoctrinated with Marxist literature. Its philosophy is communist-oriented. Took credit for the massacre at Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 30, 1972, by three Japanese.

III
9/28/72

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A P P E N D I C E S

- Appendix A - Memorandum for The Secretary of State
from the President, September 25, 1972
"Action to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix B - Memorandum for the President
from The Secretary of State
September 18, 1972
"Measures to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix C - Memorandum for the President
from The Secretary of State
September 21, 1972
"Measures to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix D - Photographs of Bomb Mailings
- Appendix E - Fedayeen Organizations
- Appendix F - FBI Special Study
September 15, 1972
"Arab Terrorist Activity in
the United States"
- Appendix G - Proposed Attorney General's answer to
FBI query regarding jurisdiction and
policy in the event of terrorist attacks
against foreign diplomatic establish-
ments in the U. S.
- Appendix H - House Resolution 15883
- Appendix I - FBI Alert for Hani Ahmed Said Al Hassan
- Appendix J - Photographs of contents of three vehicles
in TRIBOM case

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3/13/73

Appendices


A

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
**PRESSURE RELEASE
FIRING DEVICE**

**BLASTING
CAP**


EXPLOSIVES

In reprisal to your invasion of our home-land...
the land of our ancestors
In reprisal to your usurpation of our Palestine.
In reprisal to your persecution, ill-treatment and
mass murder of our people
In reprisal to your enmity of peace, which our
people struggle to determine in the land of peace
In reprisal to your continuous crimes against
humanity and Palestinians
We shall harass you and you shall pay the
price wherever you go

Black September's Org



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E

ORGANIZATION	LEADERSHIP	POLITICS	OPERATIONS	PROPAGANDA
AL FATAH	YASIR ARAFAT	Deliberately apolitical in the past, but may be swinging to the left.	Has limited its actions to military and civilian targets inside Israel and the occupied territories. Its fighting strength is 4000 - 6000. It has headquarters in Amman and Salt, Jordan. Al Asifah is military arm.	"Voice of Fatah" is broadcast from Cairo. The "Voice of Asifah" is broadcast from Baghdad. A monthly periodical is published, "Al Thawra Al Falastiniya."
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION	YASIR ARAFAT	Acting as a "parliament" of fedayeen groups, it cannot speak politically for its members.	Military actions are confined to targets inside Israel and the occupied territories. Fighting strength of its military arm, PLF, is estimated at 1000 - 1500. It has headquarters in Irbid and Jarash, Jordan.	"Voice of Palestine" is broadcast from Cairo. It also controls the Palestine Research Center in Beirut.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	GEORGE HABBASH	MARXIST	PFLP believes struggle against Israel should not be confined to Middle East, but should be international. Has conducted terrorist acts in Europe and threatens to extend them to U. S. Fighting strength is 500 - 1000. Its headquarters is in Amman.	PFLP communiques are broadcast by "Voice of Palestine."
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	NAYIF HAWATMAH	Strongly Marxist - Leninist. Hawatmah is avowed follower of MAO Tse-tung.	Basically a political organization, it engages in little military activity. Its estimated fighting strength is 200 poorly armed men. It has headquarters at Amman.	Newspaper "Al Hurriyah", published in Beirut.
AL SAIDA	TAHER DABLAN	Marxist - It follows the line of its parent organization, The Syrian Baath Party. Its ideology is closer to Peking than U.S.S.R.	Military operations are similar to those of Al Fatah with which it has cooperated in actions against Israel. Estimated fighting strength is 1000 - 1500. Headquarters is located at Damascus.	Radio English broadcasts Al Saida communiques.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command	AHMAD JABRIL	APOLITICAL	PFLP-GC conducts operations against Israel and the occupied territory and claimed credit for the 2-21-70 bombing of a Swissair plane bound for Israel. Its fighting strength is 500. Headquarters is at Irbid, Jordan.	No organized facilities
Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine	ISSAM SARTAWI	MARXIST - Calls for revolution in all Arab countries.	AOLP concentrates its attacks on Israeli occupied territory and claimed credit for 2-9-70 attack on Israeli passengers at Munich airport. Its fighting strength is 100 - 400. Its headquarters is in Amman.	No organized facilities

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DATE 02-02-2007 BY 60309 auc/tam/mlt/elh



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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-05-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITY
IN THE UNITED STATES

DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 1972

BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

WARNING NOTICE -
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SPECIAL STUDY

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

DATE: 05-30-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 05-30-2032

INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to present an overall picture of Arab terrorist activity as it directly affects the national security of the United States. It is not intended to represent a comprehensive survey of world-wide terrorist activities nor does it undertake to examine the complex and often confused organizational structure and activities of Arab terrorists, except in reference to the potential threat posed to the United States. In the interest of brevity, information has been summarized considerably, and documentation excluded. Full and specific details, where appropriate, have been furnished previously to U. S. and foreign agencies having interest, or responsibility.

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The September 4-5, 1972, kidnapping and massacre of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, West Germany, has refocused world attention on the Arab terrorist movement. However tragic and dramatic these events, they were but the most recent of such incidents involving plane hijackings, assassinations, sabotage, and numerous terrors, all committed in the name of Palestinian liberation or Arab nationalism. Initially such actions were confined to Israel and the Middle East, but within the past two years they have spread to the rest of the world, primarily Western Europe. The United States has thus far been unmarked by this terror, but considerable evidence has been amassed within the last several months demonstrating the potential for like violence to erupt within this country.

Arab terrorism is known under a variety of titles, but is generically referred to as the Fedayeen movement.* The movement is rooted in the displacement from their "homeland" of some 2,000,000 - 2,500,000 Palestinian Arabs. This was caused by the partition of Palestine in 1947 and solidified by the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. The plight of these refugees has been exacerbated by the almost continuous state of hostility existing between Israel and Arab states during the succeeding 24 years. As a consequence during this period, various paramilitary commando groups--Fedayeen--were organized among displaced Palestinians throughout the Middle East. While it remains essentially Palestinian, the Fedayeen movement has inspired Arabs the world over with its exploits. The Fedayeen objective is the "liberation of Palestine" and in its achievement would not tolerate any political solution which includes recognition of the continuing existence of the State of Israel. The movement received a particular impetus following the Arab dispute in the 6-day war in June of 1967 and has gained power, influence, and general support since that time.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forms a central umbrella-type organization under which the diverse factions of the Fedayeen movement are grouped and, to a degree, organized. Among the various factions clustered under the PLO. b1

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] The leader of Al Fatah, Yasir Arafat, is also chairman of the executive committee of the PLO. Since the June, 1967, war, the prestige and stature of Al Fatah have grown so that its name has become virtually synonymous with the Fedayeen movement. b1

*Literally, those who sacrifice themselves.
**Literally, conquest or victory.

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Al Fatah, with headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

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[REDACTED]

(RASD) has under its jurisdiction the Special Services force which is responsible for all terrorist activities. The Black September group is an elite band formed within the Special Services force and has been held responsible for the atrocities at Munich and the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister in Cairo during November, 1971. The name of this group commemorates the September, 1971, "civil war" in Jordan, during which government forces practically eliminated the Fedayeen presence. There is no indication that the Special Services force has any representation, as such, among Fatah members in the U. S.; however, Special Services agents from abroad have made contacts among U. S. members in individual circumstances.

In the United States, Al Fatah is principally represented in Texas, Missouri, California, and Washington, D. C., and is a secret group having approximately 400 members or contacts, including 75 cadre members and an executive council of eight. [REDACTED]

TEX.
MO.
CAL.
D.C.

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(S)

[REDACTED]

Kuwait. In the early stages of development in this country, the organization exploited contacts with ethnic societies such as the Organization of Arab Students and United Holy Land Fund for its support and dissemination of propaganda. There is considerable evidence that Al Fatah has broadened its contacts beyond the ethnic Arab population in the United States to include black extremist groups, as well as white-hate groups, on whose terroristic proclivities they intend to capitalize.

Within the past year, information has been developed that Fatah objectives in the United States have become more sinister and now encompass plots to assassinate Israeli officials in the United States and other pro-Israeli individuals, as well as ranking officials of the United States Government.

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Arab terrorist threats to United States [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

upon their return to the U. S. Following this

[REDACTED]

(S) b1

sequently received indicating that an Arab organization in New York City was financially supporting these propaganda activities.

2. During January, 1972, information was

[REDACTED]

(S) b1

During the discussions concerning this effort, it was alleged that Al Fatah had also considered using black militants, possibly Black Panthers, as well as an Iranian student group in the United States.

[REDACTED]

(S) b1

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] Al Fatah members in the United States had been selected to assist in the conspiracy. Counteraction was undertaken which convinced [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S)

and [REDACTED] departed the United States with no further positive action being taken to implement

[REDACTED] has been identified as the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The plot against [REDACTED] although dormant, has not been abandoned.

(S)

- 4 -

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b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

[REDACTED]

There are a number of factors which combine to make most difficult the detection and neutralization of Arab terrorism, particularly within the United States, and which simplify the complex process of conspiracy. Thousands of ethnic Arabs are in the United States as permanent residents, most of them well educated and affluent; thousands more are in this country on student visas. These form a reservoir of potential supporters for any pro-Arab movement. Entry into the United States on temporary visas issued abroad is authorized regularly with little formality; the ease of such entry by Arab terrorists under legitimate and false identity papers is well documented. Large populations of Arabs are present in other western countries, such as Canada and West Germany, and travel from such countries to the United States is largely uninhibited. Inside the United States travel is unrestricted.

Numerous extremist groups in the United States have a proclivity for violence; the coincidence of their anti-Semitic and/or anti-establishment objectives with the aims of Arab terrorism creates a sympathetic support which has not been overlooked. The use of non-Arab ethnic types to conduct terrorist activity is a known tactic of Arab terrorism, well illustrated by the Tel Aviv airport massacre. The ease of acquisition of weapons and access to assassination targets is a tragic reality in recent United States history which needs no reemphasis here. Arab terrorists, in addition to nationalism, are highly motivated by a religious zeal amounting to fanaticism. The resultant problem within the United States can be viewed only as alarming.

Continued strong support of Israel by the United States Government--military, political, and financial--has brought our Nation the hatred of the extremist elements within the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Arab world. The considerable encouragement and financial assistance rendered Israel by sympathetic American citizens and organizations have also caused Al Fatah to target the United States for acts of terrorism and violence. A successful Al Fatah blow struck at this Nation could greatly bolster the morale of the Arab world and strengthen Al Fatah's position and prestige within the Middle East.

Any practical evaluation of the potential threat to U. S. internal security posed by the Fedayeen movement is most difficult. In usual intelligence evaluations it is possible to apply a limit of credibility beyond which much information can be discounted or rejected. No such prima facie standard is possible in weighing allegations or information developed concerning Arab terrorists. The Fedayeen have demonstrated a commitment and capability for bizarre, if macabre, exploits which fully live up to and often exceed the flamboyant rhetoric and rumors which attend the movement. As evidence it is only necessary to consider the events of September 5, 1972, at the Olympic Village in Munich; the May 30, 1972, slaughter of 25 at Tel Aviv airport; the assassination of Jordan's Premier in Cairo in November, 1971--and all these, against a background of the countless other individual acts of sabotage, assassination, extortion, and pure terrorism.

It can be accepted that the Fedayeen, in the form of Al Fatah, have a significant representation in the United States. They have also demonstrated a commitment to extend their terroristic activities into this country in a variety of directions. Given these ingredients and the record, it can only be concluded that the potential threat to U. S. security is very real. Under all these circumstances, without extensive investigation, no source can be dismissed as unreliable and no information discounted as to credibility. It is only on this basic premise that Arab terrorism in the U. S. can be detected and effectively countered.

~~SECRET~~




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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh



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No. 1
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No. 2
3-7-79




POC
3-6-73
R1

P.B.S.O.

Co. 11
Date: Morning
a. Freiheit
2,500 Attend Jewish Clubs'
19th Anniversary Concert

Golda Meir's U.S. Visit



Survey Shows Massive Job

מבשר וידיעות
ד'תשכ"ג
יום ראשון
מבשר וידיעות
ד'תשכ"ג
יום ראשון

No. 1

3-7-73

ER

מבשר וידיעות
ד'תשכ"ג
יום ראשון
מבשר וידיעות
ד'תשכ"ג
יום ראשון

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GAL.

5 U.S.
GAL.

No. 2

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No. 2
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Palestinian
Bl. Sep.
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No. 2
3-7-73


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





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


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
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Bin 4 # 5 106 RT 61142
(LPH) 3-7-73



No. 3

3-7-73

FR



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dog/elh
ON 05-21-2005

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. Miller *EM/TJS*

DATE: September 28, 1972

FROM : A. J. Decker *AJD/TJS*

SUBJECT: ~~MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP
ON PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES~~

- 1 - Mr. Felt
- 1 - Mr. Bates
- 1 - Mr. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Decker
- 1 - [REDACTED]

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b7C

Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

Purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of discussions held by captioned group at State Department Headquarters at 10:30 a.m., 9/28/72. *u*

Meeting was chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Joseph Donelan, who advised that the President had scheduled the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to be held at 10:30 a.m., 10/2/72. Donelan said that he is preparing a report to be distributed to the principals delineating actions taken by captioned group and the international committee formed at the same time. *u*

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Concerning the format of the Cabinet Committee, Secretary of State Rogers will make opening remarks expressing his appreciation concerning the accomplishments of captioned group. He will then have [REDACTED] give an oral briefing on what has been done on the domestic side. This will be followed by a briefing by [REDACTED] State Department, regarding the international side [REDACTED] Treasury Department, will then brief the principals concerning Interpol action on terrorism. The Secretary of State will designate a Chairman of the Working Group of the Committee, requesting each principal to designate a representative to the Working Group. *u*

Referral/Direct

REC-8462 115260 X1

18 JUL 24 1974

AJD/FXO:ams
(6)

CLASSIFIED BY 14825
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2.5
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

Referral/Direct

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 JUL 30 1974

CLASS. & EXT. BY 9803 RDD/MS
REASON-FORM 11, 1-4.4.B
DATE OF REVIEW 9/28/92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum for Mr. Miller
Re: MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP
ON PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Direct

[Redacted Box]

[Redacted Box] ~~(S)~~ (U)

Mr. Donelan made a point of advising the group that he had again taken up with the Secretary of State the jurisdictional and policy problems which would arise if terrorists took over a foreign diplomatic establishment in Washington, D. C. I pointed out that the FBI has jurisdiction concerning assaults on certain foreign dignitaries in the U. S., and I reminded Mr. Donelan that we have asked the Attorney General for his guidance concerning legal and policy questions involving our entering foreign diplomatic establishments in the U. S. to exercise our jurisdiction. We have not received a reply from the Attorney General to our letter of 9/21/72 requesting the Attorney General's advice. (S) u

The group will next meet at 10:30 a.m. on 10/3/72. u

ACTION:

For your information. u

WGC

EM

4Xm.

~~7~~ ~~SSK~~

* On what foreign dignitaries? u

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. ☒
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO : THE ACTING DIRECTOR

DATE: 9-28-72

FROM : W. M. FELT *WMB*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

The attached memorandum from the President dated 9-25-72 created captioned group, named you as a member, and instructed that the Committee be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee.

Approved
I recommend Assistant Director E. S. Miller of the Domestic Intelligence Division be designated to represent you on this Working Group. Such other members of his staff as may be needed can be used on the Working Group.

Designation of Miller would be logical as our investigations designed to detect terrorist groups and their plans are handled in the Domestic Intelligence Division. In addition, his Division represents the FBI on the Interagency Group on Protection Against Terrorism in the United States, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. A summary is being prepared for your use in connection with your attendance at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee.

As of this writing, we have not been able to ascertain whether the first meeting on Monday, 10-2-72, at 10:30 a.m. is for principals only. Miller will be standing by if his attendance with you is indicated.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WMF:crt

(3)

Enc.

1 - Mr. Miller

REC-84

10 JUL 24 1974

ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM
(See attached 00-6 10:11P
by edm dated 9/28/72
re contents of Bulky Room)
WMB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803

84 JUL 30 1974

1 copy for Bulky Room
4/3/78
WMB

DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

September 28, 1972
1:50 PM

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b7C

[redacted] in Secretary of
State WILLIAM P. ROGERS' office
called re the meeting Monday,
Oct. 2, of the Cabinet Committee
to combat terrorism and advised as
follows:

1. Each principal is invited to bring one person with him, and it is suggested it be the designee to the working group to be established and Mr. Rogers' office would like the name as soon as possible. (Attached is a memo recommending Mr. Miller and after approval of the designee, Secretary Rogers' office will be so advised.)
 2. There will be a briefing book of the agenda which will be sent in advance and she hopes it will be tomorrow.
 3. The meeting will be on the 8th floor of the State Department, and further information will be furnished on this later. Adams Room, 8th floor and take the bank of elevators to the left of the Diplomatic Entrance as you come in.
- 1 - Tele Room

edm

MR. FELT _____
MR. BAKER _____
MR. BATES _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DALBEY _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER ✓
MR. PONDER _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____
MS. HERWIG _____
MRS. NEENAN _____

3 ring black
notebook located
in Mr. Mignosa's
office (Rm. 4042)
3/10/78 and made
bulky enclosure
to this serial.
(See 66-1855-A-2878,
encl p.8, item # 19,
which states this was
rec'd 9/29/72 from
State Dept.)
LWB
4/13/78

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DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803

ENCLOSURE

DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

October 2, 1972

At 10:30AM today, Mr. Gray is scheduled to attend a meeting of the CABINET COMMITTEE to COMBAT TERRORISM in the Adams Room on the 8th Floor of the State Department.

Assistant Director E. S. Miller will accompany Mr. Gray to the meeting.

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b7C

SA [redacted] Domestic Intelligence Division, will meet Mr. Gray at the Diplomatic Entrance of the State Department and escort him, and Mr. Miller, to the Adams Room.

MR. FELT _____
MR. BAKER _____
MR. BATES _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DALBEY _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E.S. _____
MR. PONDER _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____

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b7C

[redacted] has been advised.

Background material attached.

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DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803

62-115360-X2
ENCLOSURE

DO-6 OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

September 27, 1972
11:40 AM

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[REDACTED]
Secretary of State WILLIAM P.
ROGERS, called.

Secretary Rogers is calling an
initial meeting of the Cabinet
Committee to combat terrorism
for Monday, 10:30 AM, in the
Secretary's office, and Secretary
Rogers would like Mr. Gray to attend.

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[REDACTED] said if Mr. Gray would go to the
Diplomatic Entrance at the State Department, they
would then direct him to the Secretary's office.

(Mr. Felt was advised and Mr. Miller is preparing
background material for Mr. Gray.)

1 - Tele Room

edm

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MR. FELT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MR. BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. BATES	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. BISHOP	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. CALLAHAN	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. CLEVELAND	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. CONRAD	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. DALBEY	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. MARSHALL	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. MILLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MR. PONDER	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. SOYARS	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. WALTERS	<input type="checkbox"/>
TELE. ROOM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MR. KINLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>
MR. ARMSTRONG	<input type="checkbox"/>
MS. HERWIG	<input type="checkbox"/>
MRS. NEENAN	<input type="checkbox"/>

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT:

Action to Combat Terrorism

As I stated in the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, I have today directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, to be chaired by Secretary Rogers. I consider it to be of the utmost importance that we move urgently and efficiently to attack this worldwide problem.

This Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our Government can take appropriate action in response to terrorist acts swiftly and effectively. In this regard, Secretary Rogers will be in touch with other governments and international organizations.

I expect that you will be fully responsive to the requests of the Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to coordinate government-wide actions against terrorism.

Richard Nixon

Richard Nixon

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong

b6
b7C

EXP. PROC.
SEP 26 1972
Memo Let to Acting Director
9/28/72 one
Let to Secy State Rogers
9/28/72
ESM:la
1-7-24

ENCLOSURE

Memo Let to
Dir 9-28-72
WNIF:lea

REC-84

62-115360-X2

13 JUL 24 1974

FIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Action to Combat Terrorism

Your report to me on the measures that are being taken to combat terrorism indicates that we are moving effectively against the problem of thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad. The two committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are making commendable progress toward this end.

Because of the great importance and urgency I attach to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am hereby establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by the Secretary of State and will comprise

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to
the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.

Action.


60-115360-X2
ENCLOSURE

The Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively. The Secretary of State will be in touch with other governments and international organizations toward this goal.

Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee.

More specifically, the Cabinet Committee shall:

- (1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States.
- (2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation.
- (3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur.
- (4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs; and
- (5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard Nixon". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned at the bottom right of the page.

MEETING OF
CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

October 2, 1972

MR. GRAY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/TJS*

FROM : A. J. Decker *AD*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 9/28/72

1-Mr. W. M. Felt
1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. A. J. Decker
1-Mr. L. E. Belanger

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

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DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803 RDD/203

On a United Press International (UPI) release dated 9/25/72 announcing the creation by the President of a special Cabinet Committee to establish procedures to combat terrorism, Mr. Gray noted, "Division V should summarize for me the actions we have taken to date in the FBI and maintain this summary in a current status on a daily basis." In response thereto, a summary has been prepared for Mr. Gray and copies of same are being designated for Mr. Felt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Decker, and the Nationality Unit, Domestic Intelligence Division, which prepared the summary. Revisions and additions will be submitted on a daily basis as needed.

The summary being submitted sets forth details concerning the establishment of the Committee by the President, actions taken to date by a committee chaired by a representative of the Department of State and coordinating activities to combat terrorism in the domestic field, and actions that the FBI has taken in the past and at present to combat terrorism in the United States. A glossary of terms and an appendix of supporting documents are included in the summary.

REC-8: 62-115360-X4

Mr. Joseph Donelan, chairman of the committee coordinating efforts in the domestic field on which I represent the FBI, in a private discussion today mentioned a paper prepared by the FBI captioned "Arab Terrorist Activity in the United States," dated 9/15/72. Mr. Donelan stated that he desired to pass a copy of the FBI document to each member of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. He said the paper was the best he had ever read on the subject and mentioned that the FBI evaluation of the potential threat posed by the Fedayeen would be of material assistance to the Cabinet Committee. I told Mr. Donelan that, if the FBI publication would be of assistance to the Committee members, he could make same available to them. A copy of this publication has been designated as Tab F in the summary.

ACTION:

18 JUL 24 1974

Attached summary is being submitted pursuant to Mr. Gray's instructions.

Enclosure

84 JUL 25 1974

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt *F/TB*
FROM : D. J. Dalbey *DJD*

DATE: 9/29/72

SUBJECT: b6
LEGAL ADVISOR b7C
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

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On 9/29/72, at 4:37 P.M. a caller identifying himself as a legal advisor at the State Department, advised that and Acting Director Gray plus one of the Acting Director's top assistants were scheduled to attend a meeting at the State Department with Secretary Rogers on Monday, October 2, 1972, at 10:30 A.M. to discuss terrorism. He said that this meeting was a result of the appointment of a Cabinet level committee by the President on 9/25/72, to consider this matter.

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O.S. (id)
 said that he would like to discuss the FBI's authority for investigation under Title 28 USC § 533 with particular regard to our authority to conduct investigation in security matters. He asked specifically whether we investigate matters without particular statutory authorization. was advised that Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations § 0.85 sets out the instructions of the Attorney General to the FBI regarding the investigative activities of this Bureau. He was further advised that even though this section of the Code of Federal Regulations makes reference to Presidential directives regarding espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters that the FBI seeks to identify specific statutory authority in each of our investigations including those concerning subversive activities. It was pointed out to him that the activities of subversive groups frequently involve matters which could constitute violations of Federal statutory law.

- 1 - Mr. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Dalbey
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:deh
(4) *deh*

REC-84
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DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803 RDD/AB JUL 24 1974

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 30 1974

XEROX
JUL 24 1974

FILE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Felt
RE:

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expressed his appreciation for this explanation of FBI investigative authority and indicated that he was preparing a brief for use by Department of State personnel attending the Monday conference.

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At 4:50 P. M. the above information was furnished to Inspector D. E. Moore who indicated he would communicate it to Assistant Director Miller.

RECOMMENDATION:

None; for information.

G

7

FM
W3C

W3C

DJD
G

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/MS*

FROM : A. J. Decker *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: ~~MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP~~
ON PROTECTION AGAINST
TERRORISM IN THE U.S.

DATE: 05-23-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 05-23-2030

- 1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 9/29/73

- 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. F. X. O'Neill

CLASS. & EXT. BY *12/14/79*

REASON FOR EXT. *1-2.4.2.3*


DATE OF REVIEW *9/29/92*

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Harris _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Mr. Gray made the following notation pertaining to memorandum, same caption as subject memorandum, dated 9/26/72: "These papers and similar reports should be in a briefing book for me to be taken to Conn. this weekend along with the summary paper Mr. Miller is preparing." The briefing book has been prepared and will be forwarded to Mr. Gray prior to his leaving for Connecticut. *u*



b1

ACTION:

Prepared in accordance with Mr. Gray's request. *u*

FXON:mlr
(5)

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFIED BY *1482*
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY *1, 2, 3*
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EM *4 Nov.*

WGC

REC-84

62-113360-X6

84 JUL 30 1974

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL JUL 24 1974

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 11-03-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 11-03-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*DID TO
HANDLE*

MR. FELT ☒
MR. BATES _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CAMPBELL _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DALBEY _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E.S. ☒
MR. PONDER _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY ☒
MR. ARMSTRONG _____
MS. HERWIG _____
MRS. NEENAN _____

*These papers & similar reports
should be in a briefing book
for me to be taken to town.
This weekend along with the
summary paper Mr. Muller is
preparing.*

[Redacted]

*(C) Jim 9/26
10:18P*

b1

Mr. Gray departs the office today at 5:00 p.

9/29 8:45a.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62-115360-X6

ENCLOSURE

9803 RDD/KOB
CLASS. & EXT. BY 12/14/79
REASON-FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 9/29/92

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-03-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Supercabinet Unit To Push Security

By JAMES WIEGHART

Washington, Sept. 25 (NEWS Bureau) — President Nixon established today a special cabinet committee to combat terrorism "to prevent terrorism here and abroad."

The committee, headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and including Nixon's top cabinet officers and national security officials, was directed to coordinate terror-prevention among U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. The group would also work with other governments in a "worldwide" effort to protect U.S. officials abroad and foreign diplomats and diplomatic installations in the United States.

"Vigorous Attack"

White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that the creation of the special cabinet committee indicates that "The President attaches the utmost importance to an immediate vigorous

attack on this problem and its earliest resolution."

Although Nixon's memorandum outlining the scope of the new committee did not mention any specific type of terrorism, the President was obviously acting in the wake of activities by Arab terrorists, including the murder of 11 Israeli Olympic team members in Munich and the mailing of bombs to Israeli diplomats in the United States and other countries.

Ziegler said that Rogers had already contacted about 50 other governments in his role as head of two other high-level governmental committees already working on the problem of terrorism.

High Degree of Urgency

The creation of the special group—which includes the secretaries of treasury, defense, and transportation; the attorney general; the directors of the CIA and FBI; and Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger

—was obviously designed to give the project a much higher degree of urgency.

In his memo to Rogers spelling out the group's jurisdiction, Nixon said:

"The committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action in responding to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively."

"Federal officers and federal departments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the cabinet committee in carrying out its functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the cabinet committee."

Felt ☒
Baker ☒
Bates ☐
Bishop ☐
Callahan ☐
Cleveland ☐
Conrad ☐
Dalbey ☐
Jenkins ☐
Marshall ☐
Miller, E.S. ☒
Ponder ☐
Soyars ☐
Walters ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Mr. Kinley ☐
Mr. Armstrong ☐
Ms. Herwig ☐
Mrs. Neenan ☒

Decker
O. D. [unclear]

The Washington Post Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) _____
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) 2 _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

SEP 26 1972

Date _____

RECORDED
168 OCT 18 1972

ST-114

REC-57

MCT-19

50

216
58 OCT 20 1972

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Felt

Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Inley
Armstrong
Erwig
Neenan

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/3/72

FROM : A. J. Decker

1 - Mr. W.M. Felt
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. A.J. Decker
1 - Mr. I. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 11-03-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-03-2030

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in this matter are the following revised pages and one new page:

Pages

✓18	Revised
✓19	Revised
✓19a	New
✓20	Revised

5. Belanger

The revised pages and new page submitted at this time set forth the following:

[REDACTED] b1
[REDACTED] (S)

2 U. S. Department of State has denied a visa to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to reenter the U. S. A visa will be granted to [REDACTED] wife to reenter the U. S. where she plans to [REDACTED] b6 b7C

[REDACTED] (C)
[REDACTED] was interviewed on 10/1/72. [REDACTED] maintained that he is against violence and is applying for an Israeli visa in order to rejoin his wife in Israel and to take a teaching position in occupied territory. The Israelis have indicated they are not disposed to granting [REDACTED] a visa. (S)

b1
b6
b7C

Copies of revised pages and the new page are also being designated for Mr. Felt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Decker, and the Nationality Unit of Domestic Intelligence Division, all of whom received copies of the summary prepared for Mr. Gray.

Enclosures (4)

LEB:dgo
(5)

3 ENCLOSURES

ST-111

ACTION - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21 OCT 1972

b6
b7C

31 OCT 30 1972

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 JRM/103
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller
Re: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
summary and copies thereof.

HS

DEM

WHL EM

WHL

*G
10/1*

7

*Revised +
new pages inserted
in Mr. Gray's summary. 8:09A
old pages attached
10-4-72
edm*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-08-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-08-2030

~~SECRET~~

for the purpose of developing any information indicating that [redacted] has recently entered the U. S. Additionally, we are directing a cable to appropriate Legal Attaches to contact their sources and furnish all information coming to their attention concerning [redacted]. A photograph of [redacted] is available and has been furnished to our New York Office.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] S) b1
On September 28, 1972, our Legal Attache in Beirut advised that [redacted] has not been seen in Beirut since September 19, 1972.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] c) b1

CLASSIFIED BY 1452 SGM/103
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 18 -

9/30/72

~~SECRET~~

62 - 115360 - 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

(C) b1

(C) b1

We contemplate interviewing [redacted] prior to his return to the Middle East if he obtains a visa to enter Israel.

b6
b7C

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 *SPM/pob*
EXEMPT FROM GDS/CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 19 -

9/28/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

115360

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

5/ b1

1482 SGM/AB
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 20 -
9/28/72

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

62 115360-2

DATE: 11-03-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-03-2030

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/4/72

FROM : A. J. Decker *AD*

- 1 - Mr. W.M. Felt
- 1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. A.J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. L.E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

_____ Bates
_____ Bishop
_____ Callahan
_____ Cleveland
_____ Conrad
_____ Dalbey
_____ Jenkins
_____ Marshall
_____ Miller, E.S.
_____ Ponder
_____ Soyars
_____ Walters
_____ Tele. Room
_____ Mr. Kinley
_____ Mr. Armstrong
_____ Ms. Herwig
_____ Mrs. Neenan

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in this matter are the following revised pages and one new page:

Pages	
5	Revised ✓
18a	Revised ✓
19a	Revised ✓
23	Revised ✓
24	New ✓

S. Belanger

The revised pages and new page submitted at this time set forth the following:

1. The Attorney General has replied to Mr. Gray's query concerning jurisdiction and policy matters regarding possible terrorist takeover of foreign diplomatic establishments in the U. S. The reply is from Mr. Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and is identical to the proposed reply previously made available to us. *(S)(U)*

[Redacted]

[Redacted] On the morning of 10/4/72, [Redacted] made contact with the Washington Field Office and arranged for an interview during the early afternoon of the same day. *(S)*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Enclosures (5)

b1

ST-111

REC-57

62

21 OCT 13 1972

LEB:dgo
(5)

ENCLOSURE

58 OCT 20 1972

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller
Re: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
summary.

DEM

EM

Revised + new
pages inserted in
Mr. Gray's summary
+ old pages attached
10-5-72
edm

7

DDK

Gm
10/5
2:26 P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. In view of the fact that the FBI has no protective responsibilities for foreign diplomatic establishments in the U. S. and in view of our doubts as to the legal and policy problems involved, by letter dated September 21, 1972, from Mr. Gray, the Attorney General's attention was invited to the fact that assuming that the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate such takeovers, conferred under Title 18, Section 112, United States Code, the FBI was in doubt as to its authority to enter diplomatic premises or to make arrests within them. The Attorney General was queried as to whether, as a matter of policy, the FBI should investigate such takeovers or actually enter diplomatic premises occupied by representatives of another country where the FBI would normally be excluded from investigation due to the extraterritorial status of the premises. (C) (U)

On September 30, 1972, Mr. A. William Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, furnished us a proposed answer to Mr. Gray's inquiry.

First, such premises have no special extraterritorial status and are fully subject in theory to the usual jurisdiction of the local governmental units wherein they lie and of the Federal Government. However, in accord with long-accepted diplomatic protocol, the United States would violate its obligations under international law if it entered or permitted entry upon such premises for the purpose of law enforcement except upon invitation of the foreign government concerned. Those obligations are recognized in part by the provisions of 22 U.S.C. 252, prohibiting suits against ministers and their domestics. Accordingly, unless the government concerned requests or consents to entry through the Department of State and approval thereof is relayed to us, your agents should not enter diplomatic premises to investigate or to make arrests.

While evaluation of the specific facts of a given incident might suggest the applicability of statutes administered by the Criminal Division, involvement of diplomatic premises, embassies, consulates and the like and the proneness of terrorists for use of violent means suggest the likely availability of one or more sections of 18 U.S.C. 844, dealing with unlawful use of explosives. Undoubtedly, weapons would be involved and probably afford the basis for Federal investigation for possible gun law violations.

The entire text of the proposed answer is set out as
tab "G."

1482 89m/103
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 5 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/29/72

ENCLOSURE

115360-3

We contacted [redacted]
[redacted] INS, and pointed out to him the danger to this
country to have [redacted] on the streets in America, emphasizing
that he may well be in this country on false documentation.
[redacted] agreed with us and advised his New York Office to
immediately issue an Immigration Warrant for his arrest, to
show cause why he should not be deported if located in the
U. S. INS contacted our New York Office to advise of the
issuance of the warrant. Our New York Office will contact
FBIHQ as soon as [redacted] is located and we will advise INS.

b6
b7C

9/30/72

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and that AIC activity in no way relates to Arab terrorist activity of whatever origin. He added that many AIC employees throughout the United States feel, since the "Munich massacres," they have been subject to harassment by the U. S. Government through its intelligence agencies. He further said that it has been considered by the various AIC chapters to formally protest such investigative activity through their collective Ambassadors accredited to the United States. He stated he felt the current interview was beneficial in that it permitted him expression of his side of the story and an opportunity to refute "lies" against him.

[redacted] stated he visited the Embassy of Israel within the recent past to request issuance of a visa to allow his entry to Israel to rejoin his wife and fulfill a teaching contract in the occupied West Bank. Subsequent to this visit, he has had the feeling he has been followed by the "Israelis" or by representatives of the U. S. Government. [redacted] explained that his presence in Israel has been cleared by mutual friends in the military government and he fully expects the Embassy of Israel will issue him a visa within the next two days. On its receipt, [redacted] intends to expeditiously exit the United States, rejoin his wife, and undertake his teaching position. [redacted] stated that if he is suspected of terrorist activity, or support, by the Israelis, then his life in Israel would be in great jeopardy. He evidenced and expressed great fear for his personal safety in the above context. It was firmly stated to [redacted] that any negotiation between him and the Israeli Government is a choice he alone must consider.

b6
b7C

[redacted]
[redacted] (C)
[redacted] (c) b1

b1

1.482 7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY [signature]
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 19a -

10/2/72

ENCLOSURE

62 115360-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Those other devices received throughout the world, as reported to us, appeared to be similar in appearance and nature. Envelopes in which the various devices have been received have varied from 6 inches by 3 inches to 8 inches by 3½ inches. The explosive has been identified as RDX/PETN which has been described as readily available on the world market. Also, envelopes opened have contained a printed message from the "Black September" (Al Fatah) organization, indicating it is responsible for the mailing.

On September 27, 1972, the U. S. Postal Service telephonically advised that it had received a photograph of a latent fingerprint located on one of the envelopes recovered in England. This photograph is being made available to us. We will immediately obtain available fingerprints of known Al Fatah members in this country and elsewhere, as deemed necessary, for comparison purposes.

- 23 -

9/28/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

(6)

115360-3

DATE: 11-03-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-03-2030

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Mr. W. M. Felt
Mr. E. S. Miller

Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, B.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Herwig _____
Mr. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 10/6/72

FROM : A. J. Decker

1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised and new pages:

Pages

✓ 13	Revised
✓ 13a	New
✓ 14	Revised
✓ 15	Revised
✓ 15a	Revised
✓ 19b	New
✓ 19c	New
✓ 19d	New
✓ 23	Revised
✓ 23a	New
✓ 25	New

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 B. M. / J. S. /
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

[Redacted]
[Redacted] (C)
[Redacted] (C) b1
(3) As a result of our intense investigation, [Redacted]
[Redacted] in Washington, D. C., requested an
interview at our Washington Field Office on 10/4/72. [Redacted] (C)
[Redacted] (C)

Enclosures (11)

LEB:dan
(5)

ST-111

REC-67

15 OCT 17 1972

CONTINUED - OVER

62-115360-4

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53 OCT 20 1972

ENCLOSURE
ENC. BEHIND FILE

b1

b1

b6

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

b1

[Redacted] (C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (C) b1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (C) b1

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's summary.

JS

DEMWA

EM

Wdm

7
DDK/DMA3

G
10/11
2:07P

*New + revised
pages inserted
and old pages
attached hereto
10-12-72
edm*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-03-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

62-

HQ-115360

Serial 4



62-HQ-115360-E4

EBF

FINANCIAL

600

4

006

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

b1

(S)

b1

(S)

Referral/Direct

b1


- 14 -

9/28/72

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Interviews of Potential Terrorists



b1

(S)



b1

(S)



b1

(S)

We are furnishing results of interviews to interested Government agencies, particularly to INS in the case of aliens.


~~SECRET~~

Interviews-Potential Terrorists

~~SECRET~~

Those other devices received throughout the world, as reported to us, appeared to be similar in appearance and nature. Envelopes in which the various devices have been received have varied from 6 inches by 3 inches to 8 inches by 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches. The explosive has been identified as RDX/PETN which has been described as readily available on the world market. Also, envelopes opened have contained a printed message from the "Black September" (Al Fatah) organization, indicating it is responsible for the mailing.

On September 27, 1972, the U. S. Postal Service telephonically advised that it had received a photograph of a latent fingerprint located on one of the envelopes recovered in England. This photograph is being made available to us. We will immediately obtain available fingerprints of known Al Fatah members in this country and elsewhere, as deemed necessary, for comparison purposes.



b1

(S)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 11-03-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-03-2030

DATE: 10/10/72

- 1 - Mr. W.M. Felt
- 1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. L.E. Belanger

Felt _____

Baker _____

Dalbey _____

Jenkins _____

Marshall _____

Miller, E.S. _____

Ponder _____

Soyars _____

Walters _____

Tele. Room _____

Mr. Kinley _____

Mr. Armstrong _____

Ms. Herwig _____

Mrs. Neenan _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised and new pages:

Pages	
✓14	Revised
✓15a	Revised
✓15b	New
✓15c	New
✓20	Revised
✓23a	Revised
✓26	New

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 W.O. Cregar
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

1. The Department of State has been requested to
issue an official visa to _____

_____ in the U. S. and who, being out of the U. S.
recently, was previously barred from reentering the U. S.

b6
b7C

b1

b1

b1

Enclosures (7)

LEB:dgo
(5)

15 OCT 17 1972

ACTION - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

58 OCT 24 1972

Memorandum, W.O. Cregar to Mr. E.S. Miller
Re: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION:

summary. Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
(u)

WJ

WJM GAD
DEW/SCM

EM

G
10/11
10:23 P

*New + revised
pages inserted
and old pages
attached hereto
10-12-72
edm*


7

WJK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on enve

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-03-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh



65-115388-5

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 11-08-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-08-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) b1

b1
(S)

b1 (S)

(S) b1

It may be noted that [redacted] above, has departed the
U. S. and has been denied a visa to reenter this country. How-
ever, [redacted] has been granted a visa to return
and will [redacted] Texas.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

(S)

b1

(S)

We are furnishing results of interviews to interested Government agencies, particularly to Immigration and Naturalization Service when persons interviewed are aliens.

- 15a -

10/5/72

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

(S) b1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

(S) b1

[Redacted]

(S) b1

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Malaysia, post marking. In the envelope was a folded cardboard bearing writing, "Black September," in Arabic and English. The cardboard bore two strips of plastic explosive material as well as an additional strip which apparently was to cause the explosion.

- 23a -

10/5/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. C. W. Bates
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

IMMEDIATE

CODE

TELETYPE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO SAC SALT LAKE CITY

1 - Mr. F. X. O'Neil 10/16/72

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

MR. L. PATRICK GRAY, III

~~Cabinet Committee To Combat Terrorism~~
~~ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM IN UNITED STATES~~
~~AGAINST FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL, IS - MIDDLE~~
~~EAST.~~ (U)

AT A MEETING OF THE CABINET COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP TO COMBAT
TERRORISM IN THE U. S. OCTOBER THIRTEEN, LAST, A DRAFT DIRECTIVE WAS
PRESENTED DESIGNED TO SET FORTH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION TO BE
TAKEN IN THE EVENT THAT ACTS OF TERRORISM ARE PERPETRATED AGAINST
DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS OR PERSONNEL WITHIN THE
U. S. TERRITORY. WE HAVE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF YOUR REMARKS REGARDING
ANY ASSAULT TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE PREMISES TAKEN OVER BY SUCH A
GROUP. RECOGNIZING THE FBI IS NOT TRAINED OR EQUIPPED TO MOUNT AN
ASSAULT, EFFORTS WERE MADE AT THE MEETING TO DEVELOP LANGUAGE DELE-
GATING ANY ASSAULT WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSITATED BY THE SITUATION TO BE
CONDUCTED BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES UNDER COMMAND OF THEIR OWN OFFICERS. (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT OF THE COMMITTEE WHICH HAS BEEN REVISED
BY THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH YOUR
POSITION. IT IS CONTEMPLATED, IF YOU APPROVE, THAT THIS DRAFT WILL

FXON: bakba REC-65 ST-101 62-115360-6
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

ST-101

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 16 1972

5 10/16 PMS
TELETYPE 1972
58 OCT 30 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Felt _____
Baker _____
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Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

CLASSIFIED BY 1452 JPM/58
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELETYPE TO SALT LAKE CITY
RE: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING
TERRORISM IN UNITED STATES AGAINST FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL (C) (U)

BE CONSIDERED BY THE WORKING GROUP FOR PRESENTATION TO THE
CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDING THAT IT BE FORWARDED TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR HIS SIGNATURE.

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACKS

THE FULL RESOURCES OF THE EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT MUST AND
WILL BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT
OCCUR AND TO INSURE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE TERRORIST
EFFORTS ARE FRUSTRATED, INNOCENT VICTIMS ARE RESCUED, AND THE
TERRORISTS ARE BROUGHT TO ACCOUNT.

TO THIS END ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WILL BE
GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES:

ONE. IN THE EVENT OF ANY TERRORIST ATTACK WHICH FALLS UNDER
FEDERAL JURISDICTION, THE FBI WILL ASSUME INVESTIGATIVE AND
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING ADVISED OF SUCH AN
ACT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
HAS ALREADY BEEN DELINEATED IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ^{IN} ~~TTA HAS~~
AIRCRAFT HIJACKING MATTERS.
~~ACTION RESPONSIBILITY ONCE A HIJACKED AIRCRAFT HAS PHYSICALLY~~
~~LEFT THE RUNWAY. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS PRECLUDES DUALITY~~
~~OF COMMAND) EXCEPT AS NOTED IN ITEM NUMBER THREE).~~ (C) (U)

TELETYPE TO SALT LAKE CITY
RE: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING
TERRORISM IN UNITED STATES AGAINST FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL

TWO. OTHER FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES IN COORDINATION WITH THE FBI. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS IS A DESIRABLE PROCEDURE SINCE PRESENT STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS DIRECTIVE). (S) (U)

THREE. ALL FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND AGENCIES WILL ASSIST THE COMMAND AUTHORITY AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN MEETING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS GENERATED BY TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE COOPERATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THESE EMERGENCY SITUATIONS WILL BE SOLICITED. (ALTHOUGH NOT DELINEATED IN THE DIRECTIVE BECAUSE OF ITS PUBLIC NATURE IT IS TACITLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE MILITARY WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ASSAULT ON ANY DIPLOMATIC OR QUASI DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE COMMAND OF ITS OWN OFFICERS. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE WORKING GROUP MEETING NOTED THE MILITARY COULD ASSUME SUCH RESPONSIBILITY, HOWEVER, DEFENSE WOULD DESIRE THAT THIS RESPONSIBILITY NOT BE SPELLED OUT IN A DIRECTIVE WHICH WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC SINCE SUCH INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN CONGRESSIONAL CLAMOR AGAINST THE MILITARY BECOMING INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN UNREST). (FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE WILL INSIST THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING REFLECT THIS TACIT UNDERSTANDING). (S) (U)

TELETYPE TO SALT LAKE CITY
RE: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING
TERRORISM IN UNITED STATES AGAINST FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL

~~(S)~~ (U)

FOUR. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THROUGH IT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WHOSE NATIONS OR PROPERTY MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE TERRORISTIC ACT, WILL BE CONSULTED WITH REGARD TO ACTION TO BE TAKEN. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY).

FIVE. FOR THE PURPOSES OF FBI'S ACTION RESPONSIBILITY EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT AN ACT OF TERRORISM SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF FBI RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THREATS TO ESTABLISHMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS WHICH ARE THE EXISTING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS CLEARLY DEFINES THAT THE FBI WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THREATS WHICH ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT). ~~(S)~~ (U)

SIX. NOTHING IN THIS DIRECTIVE SHALL INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE OR PROTECTION SERVICES CONDUCTED BY AUTHORIZED FEDERAL AGENCIES. NEITHER SHALL THERE BE INTERFERENCE WITH THE EXECUTION OF OTHER NORMAL DUTIES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. (FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS IS DESIGNED TO INSURE THAT THE DIRECTIVE WILL NOT USURP ALREADY CLEARLY DEFINED INVESTIGATIVE AND PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES). ~~(S)~~ (U)

TELETYPE TO SALT LAKE CITY
RE: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERING
TERRORISM IN UNITED STATES AGAINST FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANOTHER MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN SCHEDULED
FOR THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER SEVENTEEN, NEXT, IN ORDER THAT
OUR POSITION CAN BE PRESENTED AT THAT TIME, RESPECTFULLY
REQUEST YOUR ADVICE. ~~(S)~~ (U)

NOTE:

This teletype sets forth for the personnel attention of
Mr. Gray a draft revised by the Domestic Intelligence Division
setting forth the action responsibility for countering acts of
terrorism perpetrated against diplomatic or foreign establishments
or personnel within the U. S. The Domestic Intelligence Division
has incorporated in its revisions the position taken by the
Director in his comments in a memorandum of Cregar to Miller,
10/12/72, captioned "Meeting of Interagency Groups on Protection
Against Terrorism in the United States." ~~(S)~~ (U)

Handwritten: 4/01
wob

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1482 80my/123
7/20/93
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

October 12, 1972

Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
TO THE DIRECTOR:

RE: PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM

We discussed the attached memorandum on the telephone this morning. Bill Cregar will represent the Bureau at the Working Meeting to be held at the State Department at 10:30 a. m. today.

After talking with you, I reminded Cregar of the three categories; i. e., protection, investigation and action. I pointed out that it was your desire that agents not act as shock troops to attack an Embassy that has been taken over by terrorists. I also emphasized to Cregar that we were, of course, fully agreeable to taking over any and all investigative phases of terroristic actions. I pointed out that you felt very strongly that there must be no duality of command and that whatever responsibilities are ultimately given to us by the President, regardless of their scope, the FBI must have full command. I suggested to Cregar that he point out to the Working Group that the storming of an Embassy taken over by terrorists, the control of riot situations caused by terrorists, etc., would be essentially a police operation or a military operation. Such activity would require specialized equipment such as tanks and helicopters. (X)

I also pointed out to Cregar that we could not agree to any final jurisdictional guidelines without your approval and I suggested that it would be desirable at the earliest possible time to get tentative proposals down on paper delineating jurisdiction and responsibilities so that you could review same.

W. MARK FELT

46 OCT 20 1972

Enc.

- 1 - Mr. Bates
- 1 - Mr. Miller

74 OCT 27 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Felt ✓
Mr. Baker ✓
Mr. Bates ✓
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-115360-3

NOT RECORDED

18 OCT 19 1972

See my comment to yesterday

10/12/72 memo from SA Cregar -

10/13

S-V

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: October 11, 1972

FROM : W. O. Cregar

- 1 - Mr. Bates
- 1 - Mr. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. O'Neill

SUBJECT: MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP
ON PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 SPM/102
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Purpose of this memorandum is to apprise you of matters discussed at the meeting of captioned group at State Department Headquarters, Washington, D. C., at 10:30 a.m., 10/10/72.

Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Joseph Donelan chaired the meeting and gave a brief rundown on the meeting of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism Working Group which took place 10/9/72. According to Mr. Donelan, the most important item discussed at that particular meeting was what agency would immediately take command and institute investigation if a terrorist act happened in the U. S. by a foreign-based terrorist organization.

The captioned committee was of the unanimous opinion that a strong recommendation should be made to the Working Group that the FBI should immediately undertake investigative responsibility and exercise command decision in the event of terrorist acts being perpetrated within the U. S. by such organizations as set forth above. Mr. Donelan requested that the FBI prepare a very brief recommendation for captioned group to be forwarded to the Working Committee by Thursday, 10/12/72, setting forth fact that the FBI would immediately institute such investigative responsibility.

If you approve, we will advise Mr. Donelan that the FBI will assume investigative and command responsibility for acts of terrorism perpetrated in the U. S. by a terrorist organization against foreign and diplomatic establishments and their personnel immediately upon being advised of such acts. The Bureau will naturally coordinate such activities with State Department and the White House in keeping with the Presidential directive that an immediate vigorous attack on this problem should be looked into for its earliest resolution. (X) (U)

ENCLOSURE

62-115360

FXON:bak:ams
(5)

Addendum - General Investigative Division - Page 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 3

OCT 19 1972

Referral/Direct

Memorandum for Mr. Miller
Re: MEETING OF INTERAGENCY GROUP
ON PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

b3

Referral/Direct

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1

b3

(C)

[REDACTED]

Mr. Donelan requested that the FBI Legal Attaches in Bonn,
Germany, and Tel Aviv, Israel, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1

(C)

[REDACTED] He felt that this approach should be made
first and if not successful State Department will directly approach the heads of
those governments for such papers. (X)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(X)

(U)

Referral/Direct

He offered at this time to set up a training program for the security
officials responsible for the protection of Cabinet level officials so that these
persons would have the benefit of the Executive Protective Service expertise in
this matter. Mr. Donelan also discussed the possibility of the U. S. having a
"ready team" of select individuals on alert in this country for any transportation
overseas to handle taking over of American embassies abroad by terrorists.

[REDACTED]

(C)

b1

Mr. Donelan terminated the meeting and scheduled the next meeting
for 10:30 a.m., 10/12/72.

ACTION:

If you approve, we will advise captioned committee of the Bureau's
readiness to exercise investigative responsibility as set forth in this
memorandum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION FXON:ams 10/11/72

On 10/11/72 we discussed with Mr. A. William Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, and the Attorney General's representative on the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, the matter set forth in instant memorandum. Mr. Olson agreed that the statement which we contemplate furnishing to Mr. Donelan was a correct position, adding, however, that he would change two words in the statement to read as follows:

The FBI will assume investigative and command responsibility for acts of terrorism perpetrated in the U. S. by individuals or organizations against foreign and diplomatic establishments and their personnel immediately upon being advised of such acts. (S) (U)

1482 Jm/AB
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

EM

ADDENDUM - GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION CWB:jyl 10-11-72:

While the terrorist threat is a real one and must be firmly dealt with, it is recommended we exercise caution and good judgment as to the degree of FBI involvement. We have the capability to handle investigation of criminal acts of terrorism. The majority of these acts are already covered by existing criminal statute. However, when we speak in such terms as "rescue and reaction" with respect to embassy takeovers and "ready teams" of select individuals on alert for transportation overseas to handle terrorist attacks on American embassies, we should take a long, hard look as to what this will entail. While we have had experience in hostage-type situations such as aircraft hijacking and extortionate bank robberies, the situations referred to in the above memorandum involve a much more complex operation with international ramifications. Therefore, for us to handle such a situation would require careful study, looking toward additional training of our personnel, new and sophisticated equipment, and definitive guidelines worked out with local, state, and Federal authorities who would also be involved. (S) (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WGC

CWB

7

11/5

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/TJS*

FROM : A. J. Decker *AP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 10/1/72

1 - Mr. W.M. Felt
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. A.J. Decker
1 - Mr. L.E. Belanger

DATE: 11-04-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-04-2030

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in this matter are the following revisions and new pages:

Pages	
5	Revised
5a	New
15a	New
18	Revised
18a	New
Appendices	Revised
Tab G	New
Tab H	New
Tab I	New

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1482 84m/10
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2,3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The revised and new pages submitted at this time set forth the following:

1. A proposed Attorney General answer to Mr. Gray's query regarding jurisdiction and policy in the event of a terrorist takeover of a foreign diplomatic establishment in the U. S. provides that the FBI may not enter such premises unless invited by the government concerned. Because of the interest of Department of State in such matters, the usual coordination with that agency through the Department will be observed. A pending Bill before Congress, H. R. 15883, is expected to be passed shortly and should provide expanded Federal jurisdiction regarding attacks on foreign personnel in the U. S. *(S) (U)*

2. New instructions providing for reinterviews of all known and suspected Al Fatah members in the U. S. have been issued.

Enclosures (9) *insisted into summary 10/2/72 mclaw*

LEB:dgo *dgo*
(5)

REC-84

18 JUL 24 1974

CONTINUED - OVER *ETJS*


84 JUL 30 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller
Re: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



(C)

b1
b6
b7C

An Alert is being furnished to each Special Agent in the field. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has issued an Immigration Warrant for [redacted] arrest. (X)

Revised and new pages are also being designated for Mr. Felt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Decker, and the Nationality Unit of Domestic Intelligence Division, all of whom received copies of the summary prepared for Mr. Gray.

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's summary and copies thereof.

Handwritten initials: Jb/

Handwritten: DEM

Handwritten: EM

Handwritten: 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 11-04-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-04-2030

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/13/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miner, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary
in this matter are the following new pages and a revised
page:

Pages

✓ 19e
✓ 19f
✓ 23a
✓ 23b
✓ 27

New
New
Revised
New
New

1482 80m/AB
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

(1) [redacted] who met with [redacted]

[redacted] has been arrested for
deportation by Immigration and Naturalization Service. (u)

b6
b7C

(2) An additional letter bomb postmarked in
Malaysia and addressed to a prominent Zionist leader in
New York City has been received. (u)

b1
b3

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
summary. (u)

Enclosures (5)

LEB:mlr
(5)

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Malaysia, post marking. In the envelope was a folded cardboard bearing writing, "Black September," in Arabic and English. The cardboard bore two strips of plastic explosive material as well as an additional strip which apparently was to cause the explosion.

On 10/6/72, a representative of the U. S. Postal Service advised that following delivery of a letter to Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization in America, 65 East 52nd Street, New York, New York, the Postal Inspectors were notified that individuals at the above organization were suspicious of its contents. The letter was returned to the Postal Service, X rayed and it was determined to contain an explosive device. The envelope was pink in color with red and blue air mail border and was about eight inches by three inches. It contained three Malaysian stamps and was postmarked 9/30/72. Penang, Malaysia, with return address of [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] After disarming, the device was scheduled to be delivered to the U. S. Postal Service Crime Laboratory.

b6
b7C
b7D

On October 6, 1972, the [redacted] advised our Legal Attache at Bonn that on October 5, 1972, a letter bomb, containing an explosive device similar to those previously mailed from Amsterdam, had been received. The letter was addressed to Dr. Arnold Schustermann, Nelly Sach Haus Five, [redacted] The letter had been air mailed in Malaysia and bore the return address of [redacted]

The Nelly Sach Haus is a Jewish home for the aged. Schustermann is deceased. The device was deactivated by the police.

We have alerted all offices of the receipt of the Malaysian mailing in the U. S. and we have requested our Legal Attache in Singapore to contact cooperative agencies to develop any pertinent information concerning identities of individuals listed on the return addresses. We have disseminated pertinent information relative to the Malaysian mailings above to The White House, the State Department, the Attorney General and all interested agencies in the U. S. intelligence community.

DATE: 11-04-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-04-2030

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/19/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WO/cg*

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. *✓*
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised pages and one new page:

Pages

✓ 5a
✓ 13
✓ 28

Revised
Revised
New

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

(1) H. R. 15883, providing expanded protection of
foreign officials, signed into law by the President on 10/18/72.

[Redacted]

b1

c)

[Redacted]

b1

Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

(C)

up

b1

(C)

(C)

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
summary.

Enclosures (3)

ENCLOSURE

LEB:mlr

(5)

ST 100

REC-75

11 OCT 27 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1482-89m/03
CLASSIFIED BY 7/20/78
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

Revised & New Pages
inserted + old
pages attached
hereto
edgm
10/20/72
10/20/72
293
1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In this regard there is also set out as tab "H" a copy of H.R. 15883, proposed legislation pertaining to the murder and kidnapping of foreign officials and official visitors and their protection. The Senate and House conferees are in the process of signing off on this Bill. State Department feels it will be cleared by the conferees by September 29, 1972.

It is recognized that many possible violations of Federal statutes might occur in the event of a terrorist takeover of a diplomatic establishment in Washington, D. C. However, the following statutes are considered among the most likely to be violated:

Assaulting or Killing Foreign Personnel	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 112
Conspiracy	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 371
Extortion	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 875, 876, 877
Kidnapping	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 1201, 1202

(X)U

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
ON 02-16-2006

1482 80m/DB
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 5a -

9/29/72

62-115360-8

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-16-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-16-2031

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAC
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 10/17/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary
in this matter are the following revised and new pages:

Pages

✓10	Revised
✓10a	New
✓19f	Revised
✓23b	Revised
✓23c	New

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

(2) [redacted] previously arrested for
deportation, was released on 10/17/72 on the condition that
he voluntarily depart the U.S. on or before 11/17/72...

(3) A letter bomb, mailed from Malaysia and
addressed to a Zionist leader in New York City, exploded
in a Bronx Post Office on 10/14/72, injuring a U.S. Postal
Service employee.

Enclosures (5)

LEB:mlr

(5)

REC-75

ACTION - OVER

OCT 27 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57 NOV 2 1972

7440
New Revised pages
inserted into pages
attached to
10-19-72

CLASS: & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/17/92

9803 800/100
12/14/72

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update
Mr. Gray's summary. (u)

HS
DEN/10/18

WPM

Em

7

SLK

Gm
10/18
11:36P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-07-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-07-2030

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (CONTINUED)

~~SECRET~~

By teletype dated February 4, 1972, to selected SACs,
we instructed [redacted]

b1

(S)

(S)

b1

Bureau airtel to all SACs dated June 9, 1972, insti-
tuted [redacted] investigations of all members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab terrorist
organization which took credit for the massacre at Lod
International Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 30, 1972. (S)

b1

(S)

(S)

b1

1482 *SDm/28*
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 10 -

9/28/72

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-9

~~SECRET~~

b1

b3

b6

b7C

[redacted] advised Immigration and Naturalization Service on October 12, 1972, that he would voluntarily submit to deportation if he was allowed four or five days to "clean up" his affairs. This request was not granted and [redacted] is still in jail as of AM, October 13, 1972, awaiting his hearing on October 17, 1972.

1482 89m/DB
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 19f -
10/13/72

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

100-115360-9

DATE: 02-16-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-16-2031

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

of the envelope was a dark blue airmail sticker which read "Mel Udara Par Avion." In the right hand corner were three stamps, two of which were green in color and of two dollar denomination. These two stamps had a picture of a butterfly on them. The other was a fifty cent stamp, pink in color with a picture of a yellow bird on it. Also on the front of the envelope was a white address sticker approximately 7/8 inches by 3 inches. The letter was addressed as follows: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] US of A. The US of A was underlined. The franking stamp indicated that the letter was mailed from Denano, Malaysia. The date was illegible. On the back of the envelope in longhand was the return address of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that she is acquainted with a [REDACTED] who is also active in the Zionist movement in the New York area and just recently returned from Africa where she was on a speaking tour.

b6
b7C

We have alerted all offices to the receipt of the Malaysian mailings in the U.S., and we have requested our Legal Attache in Singapore to contact cooperative agencies to develop any pertinent information concerning identities of individuals listed on the return addresses. We have disseminated pertinent information relative to the Malaysian mailings above to The White House, the State Department, the Attorney General, and all interested agencies in the U.S. intelligence community. (X) (U)

b1
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1482 80m/123
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

- 23b -
10/12/72

62-115360-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER

DATED 03-12-2007

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW

DATE: 10/31/72

lt _____
aker _____
ates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised and new pages: (U)

Pages

✓ 10b
✓ 10c
✓ 18a
✓ 19f
✓ 23d
✓ 23e
✓ 23f

Revised
New
Revised
Revised
New
New
New

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The enclosed pages set forth the following: (U)

(1) The leadership of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an Arab terrorist organization,
has concluded its full support for international terrorism
against Israel and Israeli interests throughout the world
must be re-evaluated. The conclusion is based upon the belief
that most foreign governments, including their intelligence
and police organizations, are hostile to the Palestinian
Fedayeen groups and can be expected to cooperate with the
Israelis in the event of an all-out terrorist war. (c) (c)

(3) [redacted] arrested by Immigration and
Naturalization Service for deportation but released 10/17/72. b6
on condition he voluntarily depart the U. S. before 11/17/72, b7C
left the U. S. 10/25/72. (U)

DATE: 02-16-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 02-16-2031

REC-47

23 NOV 6 1972

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] When stopped by Dutch authorities in Amsterdam 10/23/72, his luggage contained a quantity of grenades, explosives, and other letter bomb paraphernalia, as well as names and addresses of Israeli or Jewish individuals. We identified the two individuals with U. S. addresses as officials of a Jewish and a Zionist organization, respectively. (e)(e)

(5) Two persons were injured seriously in Beirut when two letter bombs exploded there 10/25/72. Both letters were believed to have been mailed locally. One was addressed to a businessman of Palestinian origin who has been active in Fatah, an Arab terrorist organization. (e)(e)

(6) Three letter bombs similar to those mailed from Amsterdam were intercepted 10/24/72 by Israeli postal employees at a small village on the Lebanese border. The letters were addressed to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Secretary of State Rogers, respectively. No suspects have been developed, but Israeli officials are investigating the possible involvement of [REDACTED] a 20 year-old native born U. S. citizen who was arrested by the Israelis 10/25/72 for a border violation. (e)(e) b6 b7C

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's summary. u

New + revised pages
inserted & old pages
attached hereto.
edm 11-2-72

EM
bcm

DDK
DmAB

Wdm
11-2
3:13P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

HL D

~~SECRET~~
b1

(C)

(C)
b1
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-09-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-09-2030

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

9803 RDD/AB
12/14/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/20/92



- 10b -
10/20/72


62-115360-10

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOORUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~(U)~~

Referral/Direct

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
ON 02-16-2005

~~9803 RDD/MS
12/14/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/4/92~~

- 18a -

10/4/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-10

DATE: 11-08-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-08-2030

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/31/72

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

10-2
Baker ☒
Bates ☒
Bishop ☒
Callahan ☒
Cleveland ☒
Conrad ☒
Dalbey ☒
Jenkins ☒
Marshall ☒
Miller, E.S. ☒
Ponder ☒
Soyars ☒
Walters ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Mr. Kinley ☒
Mr. Armstrong ☒
Ms. Herwig ☒
rs. Neenan ☒

8/2
During the last meeting of the subcommittee of captioned Cabinet Committee, it was brought up that some agency should evaluate terrorist intelligence data and provide a regular weekly summary on both foreign and domestic developments. The White House representative, [redacted] initiated the discussion and it can be assumed that [redacted] who is in [redacted] Office, is voicing a request from [redacted] (u)

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b1
b3

The Bureau prepares similar summaries relative to other domestic situations such as the FBI Summary of Extremist Activities. These summaries serve a definite purpose in providing a highly condensed intelligence picture to high level officials. They have been very well received in the past. (u) *(e) u*

The production of a terrorist summary, at least on a temporary basis until the threat eases up, has merit and although superimposing an additional project on an already heavy workload will be a definite burden, it is believed the Bureau should comply with the Committee request and produce a terrorist summary. (u)

TJS:bjr
(4)

REC-69 62-115360-11

CONTINUED - OVER

60 NOV 16 1972

ST-111 NOV 8 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW
9803/2002/023
12/14/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

X (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That a special terrorist summary be produced by Research
Section on a temporary basis for distribution to the White House and mem-
bers of the intelligence community as well as the Cabinet Committee (W)

Approved.

7

WGC

EM

SPK

J
11-1

8:22P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-08-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-08-2030

Memorandum

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/25/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/25/2002

Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. ☒
Ponder _____
Royars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised and new pages: (u)

Pages

✓ 5a	Revised
✓ 10a	Revised
✓ 10b	New
✓ 23c	Revised
✓ 26a	New
✓ 29	New

b1
b3

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block] an [Redacted Block] in REC 68

(c) Brazil, stopped by Dutch authorities in Amsterdam on [Redacted Block] luggage contained 75 letter bombs, a portion of which were addressed to Israelis, five pistols, five hand grenades, and an unknown quantity of detonators. (c)

[Redacted Block]

[Redacted Block] (c)

(c) b1
b6
b7C

(c) b1
b3

Enclosures (6)

LEB:rmb/mlr
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

80 NOV 20 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. S.

CLASSIFIED BY 1453 80m/ab
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

8160
3-1-99
(1) 2002

145-183400
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 145-00

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(4) [redacted] and [redacted] have
applied for U.S. visas to visit Berkeley California

b1
b3
b6
b7C

[redacted]
[redacted] (C)

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update
Mr. Gray's summary. u

EM

hgh
New + Revised pages
inserted + old pages
attached hereto.
edw
10-27-72

Gm
10/26
8:18 P

1
DOK
DmAs

b1

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

61-09-71-29

on enve

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-08-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

In this regard there is also set out as tab "H" a copy of H. R. 15883, legislation which pertains to the murder and kidnapping of foreign officials and official visitors and their protection. The Bill was passed by Congress on October 13, 1972, and signed into law by the President on October 18, 1972. The Department of Justice has given every indication that it desires that we have investigative jurisdiction of violations of this law.

It is recognized that many possible violations of Federal statutes might occur in the event of a terrorist takeover of a diplomatic establishment in Washington, D.C. However, the following statutes are considered among the most likely to be violated:

Assaulting or Killing Foreign Personnel	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 112
Conspiracy	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sec. 371
Extortion	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 875, 876, 877
Kidnapping	Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 1201, 1202

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

(C)

/

(C)

b1

b3

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW

~~9803 RDD/KB
12/14/79
10/17/92~~

- 10a -
10/17/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on an envelope containing an explosive device which was received last Tuesday (October 10, 1972) by a woman who is also an [redacted] but this device did not explode.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised they are working on the assumption that the individuals or group responsible for sending these explosive devices through the mail are using a New York directory that is over two years old, since [redacted] moved from her former Bronx address over two years ago. The Postal Service has primary jurisdiction in this matter. u

b6
b7C

(c) b1
b3

9803 RSO/DB
12/14/79
CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/16/92

b1

- 23c -
10/16/72

-3-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

DATE: 11-08-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 11-08-2030

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 03-12-2007

- 1 - Mr. W.M. Felt
- 1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

Baker
Beale
Bishop
Callahan
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 10/30/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar

- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(c)

b1

Relative to our contingency plans, it will be noted that during the period 10/25-27/72 conferences were held with appropriate SACs and other investigative personnel involved in investigations of terrorists to fully explore the provisions of the new bill providing for protection of foreign diplomatic personnel and other official guests in the U. S. The Domestic Intelligence Division is currently preparing guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans by each field office. These guidelines, which will be completed by 11/1/72, will be submitted to Mr. Gray for his approval prior to dissemination to the field. If approved, the field will be requested to develop specific contingency plans for its office tailored to cover the local situation. It is anticipated that the guidelines will require contingency planning in the following categories: REC 68

1. Command authority ST-III
2. Communications
3. Manpower requirements
4. Equipment requirements
5. Identification of potential targets
6. Liaison with other interested agencies, both local and Federal

20 NOV 10 1972

b6
b7C

Additionally, the Domestic Intelligence Division is preparing and will submit to Mr. Gray for his approval an overall Headquarters contingency plan covering the applicable categories enumerated above.

LEB:tdp (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

54 NOV 1972
SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASS. & EXT. BY 9803 RAO/103
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 12/14/75
10/30/92

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

b1

(C)

The individual identified as [redacted] who was to be used in the plan to assassinate King Husayn of Jordan and "the most beautiful and most dangerous member of all Fatah" is not believed identical with [redacted]

159

b6
b7C
b1
b3

has been a resident of the U. S.

53

is being added to Mr. Gray's summary and we are continuing our attempts to fully identify "Randa." (S)

ACTION:

For information.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-09-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY WATCH GROUP
OF CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
DATE: 11/6/72

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
1 -
1 -

[Handwritten initials]
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt ☒
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. ☒
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

b6
b7C

The Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism has established an Emergency Watch Group (EWG) which would be immediately convened for purposes of opening lines of communication between affected agencies in the event a terrorist act is committed in the United States. Each agency on the Cabinet Committee is to designate a representative and alternate representative to the EWG.

b6
b7C

Plans call for EWG to convene at the Operations Center, U. S. Department of State and act as a coordinating group among the various agencies to assure passage of intelligence information to agencies involved. A standard notification procedure has been worked out for responding to a terrorist act in the U. S. This procedure insures immediate notification to FBI Headquarters, Deputy Director for Operations at Department of State Operations Center, White House Situation Room, Secret Service and National Security Agency Command Center.

These procedures are being incorporated into the Bureau's contingency plans. It is believed that a Special Agent from Domestic Intelligence Division should be designated as FBI EWG representative with a Special Agent from General Investigative Division being designated alternate. Both Agents should attend any meetings held for indoctrination and briefing purposes. This has been coordinated with General Investigative Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That SA of Domestic Intelligence Division be designated representative and SA General Investigative Division, be designated alternate representative.

b6
b7C

CEE:rlc *rlc*
(8)

REC-63

OK
RGT-113

EM

62-115360-6406P
NOV 21 1972
NOV 13 1972

PERS. REC. UNIT

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

NOV 22 1972

CODE

TELETYPE

TO: SACS ALBANY
ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BOSTON
BUFFALO
CHICAGO
DALLAS
DETROIT
EL PASO
HOUSTON
JACKSON
KANSAS CITY
LOS ANGELES

MIAMI
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PORTLAND
ST. LOUIS
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WFO

1 - Mr. H. T. Telle
1 - Mr. H. T. Callahan
1 - Mr. E. J. Miller
1 - Mr. W. G. Coughlin
URGENT
1 - Mr. F. X. O'Neill
1 - Mr. T. H. George
11/14/72

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-09-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

FROM: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST.

THE BUREAU IS FURNISHING A RESUME OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REGARDING ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ON A WEEKLY BASIS TO THE "CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM," WHICH WAS SET UP AT PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST TO COORDINATE U. S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN THIS FIELD. IN ORDER TO FURNISH UP-TO-DATE INTELLIGENCE, EACH RECIPIENT WILL SUBMIT ON A WEEKLY BASIS, TO REACH THE BUREAU NO LATER THAN CLOSE OF BUSINESS EACH MONDAY, A TELETYPE SUMMARY OF ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITY WHICH HAS TRANSPIRED WITHIN YOUR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES THE PREVIOUS WEEK. INCLUDE IN THIS SUMMARY INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY PERTINENT MEETINGS OF BOTH PRO-ARAB OR PRO-ISRAELI GROUPS, ACTIVITIES

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED

192 NOV 20 1972 NOTE PAGE TWO

NOV 14 1972

NOV 20 1972

51 NOV 27 1972

TELETYPE UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-186

Teletype to SACs Albany, et al
Re: Arab Terrorist Activities

OF OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THIS FIELD, ADVERSE PUBLICITY RECEIVED DUE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AND DETAILS REGARDING ANY FOREIGN GROUPS VISITING YOUR AREA WHICH MAY BE TARGETS OF ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THOSE MATTERS DIRECTLY CONSIDERED ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND IN NO WAY ELIMINATES THE REQUIREMENT THAT YOU REPORT PERTINENT INFORMATION AS IT IS RECEIVED. THIS DATA SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED IN YOUR SUMMARY.

FIRST SUMMARY IS DUE BY NOVEMBER TWENTY, ONE NINE SEVEN TWO.

NOTE:

The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism has requested the Bureau furnish on a weekly basis information pertaining to captioned matter. By furnishing same, we are in a position to show FBI is actively involved in combating terrorism and obtaining intelligence which can materially assist if acts occur in the United States.

57

11-14-72

b2

ENCLOSURE

62 - 115360 -

S.

Relay Offices
Direct

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

DATE: 11/8/72

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM : W. O. Cregar

DECLASSIFIED BY 60308 auc tam/mlt/elh
ON 11-08-2005

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised and new pages:

Pages

✓ 10b	Revised
✓ 10bl	New
✓ 10c	Revised
✓ 10d	New
✓ 23e	Revised
✓ 23el	New
✓ 23e2	New
✓ 23f	Revised
✓ 23g	New
✓ 23h	New

1482 SQm/10B
7/20/78
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 1, 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

[Redacted content]

b1
b3
(S)

b1
b3
(S)

Enclosures

LEB:bak
(5)

REC-70

62-115360-15
CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

3 NOV 22 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

One target is King Husayn and the other may be an attempt to destroy dock facilities in Israel.

(3) [] advised that [] (previously stopped by Dutch authorities while carrying letter bombs in his luggage) was detained for questioning in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia shortly after he returned to Brazil on 10/26/72. [] has denied ownership of explosive material he was carrying in the Netherlands and admits to one visit to the United States in June-July, 1972. [] believed to be sister of [] interviewed at Belle Glade, Florida, and she alleged she had not seen [] since she left Jordan in 1965. The [] has furnished information to us that the Brazilians have received information indicating that Brazilian diplomatic establishments and/or Brazilian officials in the United States may be the objects of unspecified terrorist activities in the near future. (S) (U)

b6 PER FBI
b7C
b7D

(4) On 10/30/72 Singapore Postal authorities intercepted two letter bombs. Later 13 letter bombs were also intercepted. Three of the bombs were addressed to New York addressees. Additionally, a letter bomb originating in Singapore was received by a firm in London. (S) (U)

ACTION:

Enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's summary.

187
New + Revised pages
inserted + old
pages attached
hereto edm
11-15-72

Jim
11-15-
1:00 A

~~2~~ EM

PPK

WdM
DEM/OLM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on enve

ALL INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-08-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh



293
L.

62-115-60-15

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

(S) b1

[redacted]

With reference to the two names and addresses in New York City found in the possession of [redacted] investigation by our New York Office identified them as follows. [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] whose offices were located at [redacted] until September, 1972. He is a [redacted] resides in Jerusalem, but was visiting in the U. S. until mid-October, 1972. [redacted] reportedly intercepted a letter bomb directed to him in Jerusalem in early October, 1972.

Results of our investigation concerning [redacted] [redacted] were disseminated to the President, State Department, [redacted] military intelligence and other interested agencies. [redacted] was not known to [redacted] nor to an associate of [redacted]. Both advise the New York City addresses and names found in the possession of [redacted] would be readily available to Arab terrorists as they have appeared in various Jewish directories and publications. We advised [redacted] the associate of [redacted] and the Special Investigation Section, New York City Police Department, as to the contents of [redacted] luggage confiscated by Dutch authorities in Amsterdam.

b2
b6
b6
b7D

Our Legat at Beirut reported the following information concerning two letter bombs which exploded there October 25, 1972. No one was killed but two persons were injured seriously and may lose their sight. Both letter bombs were believed to have been mailed locally. One exploded at the main post office where it was being handled by a postal clerk. It was addressed to one [redacted] but the clerk could not recall the address. The other exploded when it was opened by a secretary at the Universal Trading Company, Gefinor Building, Beirut. It was addressed to [redacted] a [redacted] who is of Palestinian origin and has been active in Fatah. We disseminated the information developed by our Legat to the White House, State Department, military intelligence, and other appropriate agencies.

b6
b7C

Our Legat at Tel Aviv reported the following information received October 25, 1972, from the [redacted] concerning letter bombs addressed to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Secretary of State Rogers. The letter bombs were intercepted by Israeli postal employees, October 24, 1972, at a small village on the Lebanese border.

b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Two letters had been deposited in one letter box and a third letter in another. The letters were described as similar to those which had been mailed from Amsterdam. Addresses were typed on labels with no return address used and Israeli postage was affixed to each. The letters bore the numbers 42, 43, and 47 respectively, but the significance of the numbers was not known. We immediately advised the White House, Defense Department, [] and other interested agencies by teletype.

b2

As of October 28, 1972, [] investigation of the three letter bombs had developed no suspects. Worldwide press reports, however, linked them with the arrest of [] a 20-year-old native born U. S. citizen. [] advised, however, [] had been arrested October 25, 1972, by an Israeli Defense Forces patrol when he attempted to cross the border into Lebanon. He was charged with a violation of the Israeli law "criminal infiltration."

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation of the offense determined [] had been residing with relatives in Jerusalem. Upon interview of them, [] found a supply of envelopes belonging to [] similar in type to those used in the letter bombs intercepted at the Israeli-Lebanese border. [] advised on October 29, 1972, that [] was still being detained for investigation of his attempt to cross the border and that circumstances of the violation in relation to the time and place of the interception of the letter bombs would require some investigation of him in relation to the letter bombs. [] noted, however, that a latent fingerprint found on one of the letter bombs was determined not to be identical with [] fingerprints.

b6
b7C
b7D

Results of our investigation concerning [] including information furnished to our Legat by [] was disseminated by teletype to the White House, State Department, [] military intelligence, and other interested agencies.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Gebhardt

FROM : R. J. Gallagher

DATE: November 24, 1972

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Schutz
1 - Mr. Matheson


b6
b7C

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

This is to advise that on the afternoon of 11/22/72, I attended a meeting of the above-captioned working group. The meeting was chaired by Ambassador Armin Meyer and 19 items were on the agenda. This is to set forth the items of interest to the General Investigative Division that were discussed.

b6
b7C

Referral/Direct



Enclosures

RJG:mcw

(7)
57 DEC 7 1972

SI-111

REC-73

CONTINUED - OVER

23 NOV 27 1972

Referral/Direct

6-08F

Gallagher to Gebhardt Memo
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

There is attached a proposed agenda for a NATO meeting on terrorism in Europe, 12/13-14/72. It is to be noted that on Wednesday, 12/13/72, from 2:30 to 4:00 p. m. the agenda deals with international action against hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft.

Referral/Direct

There is attached a paper setting forth responsibilities within the Department of State for handling hijackings as well as the plans of the French Government concerning aircraft hijackings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Public Law 92-539 was also briefly discussed and the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Direct

ACTION: This is for information.

256

REVISED AGENDA
CCCT WORKING GROUP
Nov. 22, 1972

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-09-2005 BY 60309 uc tam/mlt/elh

1. Late Letter Bomb Analysis - [redacted]
2. Negotiations with Cuba: State of play and objectives
3. Extradition procedures - Asst. Atty. Gen. Olson
4. Overseas Contingency Planning - [redacted] (supplied previously)
5. Mid-December Consultations at NATO (proposed agenda attached)
6. Meeting with OAS ad hoc committee on terrorism
7. Request from Canadians for trans-border SOP's
8. State-~~DOT~~ Guidelines
9. SOP at State Department for hijacking events (attached)
10. PL 92-539 Guidelines
11. Official Guest Machinery (SOP attached)
12. IEC Target Report (supplied separately)
13. Weekly Analysis of Intelligence on Terrorism (WAIT) Report (supplied separately by [redacted])
14. JDL reports: a) ATF;; b) Justice re Prosecutions; c) FBI to come
15. Contingency Planning with Embassies
 - a. Yugoslavs - Concern re Dec. 2. 100 foot rule?
 - b. Indians - Roster and floor plan received.
 - c. Consultative focal point - Donelan Committee.
16. SOP for U.S. Embassies when Skyjacking Threats [redacted] (Tasked to State EB/AV) [redacted]
17. UN Debate on Terrorism - prospective outcome
18. ALPA Boycott Threat - Meeting Nov. 27; IFALPA Mexico Dec. 18
19. Public Pressures for tougher anti-skyjacking measures (Threat of peremptory Congressional action)

b6
b7C

*Unusable to Terrorists
as per [redacted]*

62-115360-16

ENCLOSURE

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR NATO MEETING ON TERRORISM

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-09-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

9:30 a.m.

Practical Objectives in the Campaign Against
"International Terrorism"

FYI

- A. What we are not aiming at: Traditional violence which is covered by established codes (e.g. common crimes), internal political disputes, civil strife, de-colonialization, bi-national or regional quarrels, internal or international armed conflict.
- B. What we are aiming at: The prevention of the spread of violence to countries not directly concerned, the victimization of innocent persons, and the preservation of the vital machinery of international life.
- C. Specific areas for achievable progress: 1) Offenses against foreign officials; 2) Aviation security; and 3) Exportation of violence to non-involved countries. End FYI.

11:00 a.m.

International Action Against Kidnapping and Assassination of Diplomats and other Foreign Officials (Now before UNGA).

- A. Substance of International Law Commission's draft articles.
- B. Expeditious action to adopt convention.

2:30 p.m.

International Action Against Hijacking and Sabotage of Civil Aircraft.

- A. Tokyo, Hague and Montreal ICAO Conventions.
- B. Essentials of an Enforcement Convention.

4:00 p.m.

International Action Against the Export of Violence to Non-Involved Countries.

- A. Criteria for acts to be covered (narrow focus; differentiation from political issues).
- B. Expeditious action to adopt convention.

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-16

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14

9:00 a.m. Intelligence Cooperation

- A. Via Interpol
- B. Special Arrangements
- C. Letter Bomb Alerts

9:45 a.m. Domestic Precautionary Measures

- A. Scrutiny of Passports, Visas and Luggage.
- B. Protective Services for Vulnerable Targets.
- C. Contingency Planning, e.g. with Embassies.

11:00 a.m. Anti-Hijacking Measures

- A. Screening Techniques and Technology
- B. Government vs Airline Responsibilities
- C. Extent of Resistance to Hijacker Demands
- D. IFALPA Boycott Threats
- E. Exchange of Technology Programs

RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR HANDLING HIJACKINGS AND THREATS OF
IMMINENT DANGER TO CIVIL AIRCRAFT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-09-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

I. Hijackings

Upon receipt of information from any source about an aircraft hijacking, the Department of State Operations Center will immediately alert the following:

- (1) S/S
- (2) The Federal Aviation Administration Operations Center (FAA is responsible for informing US airlines).
- (3) FBI (To establish liaison although the FAA will normally have alerted the FBI)
- (4) Office of Aviation (EB/OA/AVP)
- (5) M - Deputy Under Secretary for Management Macomber
- (6) S/CCT - Ambassador Armin Meyer (or)
- (7) Appropriate bureau and country officers (see special instructions for hijackings to Cuba)
- (8) The White House Situation Room and CIA Operations Center
- (9) OC/P (Diplomatic Pouch and Courier Operations Divisions)
- (10) SCS

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b7C

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Department of Defense will be alerted by the INR/RCI Watch Officer and the Military Representative. As the situation develops and as additional information is available, the Watch will brief S/PRS and L/M/SCA.

(The listing of alerts by number is for format purposes only; alerts are frequently simultaneous by conference call and the situation often determines the order.)

Action Responsibility

(1) The Office of Aviation (EB/OA) is designated as the initial State Department action office for aircraft hijackings. When there are indications that an aircraft has been hijacked, the Operations Center will alert a designated EB/OA officer.

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-16

In cases involving a hijacking abroad the Operations Center will also alert the bureau concerned. In all cases of a hijacking abroad involving a US airline, or US citizens, or in a domestic hijacking in which a foreign destination for the aircraft is known, the Operations Center will alert the country director of the area concerned. The appropriate country director, or his designee, will provide foreign policy advice and other assistance to the action officer.

If the situation requires, a working group will be established in the Task Force area of the Operations Center. Once the problem becomes clearly limited to a single country (as was the case in the 1970 Jordan incident), primary action responsibility may be shifted to the country director concerned, and the Office of Aviation shall provide technical advice as necessary.

(2) [] will provide the Department's policy guidance to the Working Group.

(3) Ambassador Meyer, or his designated representative, will assume responsibility for monitoring and assisting the Working Group as the situation requires.

b6

b7C

(4) The DDO will insure that the Operations Center's communications facilities are utilized to the full benefit of the Working Group by arranging for conference calls with the FAA, FBI, the airline involved and with overseas posts as necessary.

(5) The Working Group, with the assistance of the Operations Center, will be responsible for maintaining a general chronology of actions taken during the incident, particularly actions taken in response to policy guidance from [] or his designated representative. Until a Working Group is established or if no Working Group is established, the Operations Center will maintain this chronology in its regular log.

b6

b7C

II. Threats Of Hijacking or Aircraft Sabotage

Upon receipt of information from any source indicating a possible danger to United States aircraft, the Department of State Operations Center should alert the Federal Aviation Administration's Operations Center unless it is evident

that the FAA has been informed. If there is any doubt in this respect, it should be resolved by calling the FAA. Where highly sensitive classified information is involved, the Operations Center should first consult the originating office unless the urgency of the threat does not permit it to do so.

If the FAA desires to transmit, outside of regular working hours, a warning to a foreign government or to a US airline through a foreign service post, the Operations Center should seek to obtain a clearance of one of the designated EB/OA officers and of the duty officer for the bureau concerned. However, if the urgency of the situation requires, the message may be sent without the clearance of either or both of the offices concerned.

BRIGADE (NEWSFEATURE)

By Terry Williams

Paris, Nov. 20, Reuter - The international threat of hi-jackings and urban guerrilla action has promoted the French police to form a specially trained 40-man anti-commando brigade in the capital.

The men of the brigade, already known by its French initials as the B.A.C., are hand-picked from volunteers. They are all specialists. Many are expert marksmen, others are skilled at close combat, and some have detailed knowledge of the use of anaesthetising darts fired from guns.

All are undergoing strenuous training daily to be ready to deal with anything from a commando attack to an air hijacking or the more frequent case here of a lone armed man barricaded inside a house.

A police official, who described the training of the brigade, said there were often cases in France where such a force could be used -- such as "madmen barricaded inside a house and other delicate cases where we have to go in and fetch someone out."

But he added that the Palestinian guerrilla attack on Israel's Olympic team at Munich in September had obviously been a determining factor in the decision to set up the brigade.

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-16

The brigade is divided into five eight-man squads and one is always on full alert. It is officially described as "tactical intervention squad."

High-speed cars and helicopters are always on standby to rush them anywhere in the capital or to either of Paris' two international airports.

The brigade has been training at an undisclosed location in Paris, perfecting their marksmanship and commando techniques.

Another specialty covered by the training is the use of anaesthetic darts, widely used on animals in game reserves and likely to be among the new units more important weapons.

The B.A.C. is the direct responsibility of Paris police prefect Jacques Lenoir who gave the job of forming the brigade to a senior, but un-named, police officer after lengthy discussion with Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin.

The nearest organization to the B.A.C. in France until now has been the behind-the-scenes police anti-gang squad, which mainly concerned itself with top criminal organizations.

In the past this squad has been called in to deal with particularly delicate problems and has one spectacular success to its credit, the foiling of an attempted hijack at Orly Airport in December 1971.

A 29-year-old Frenchman there threatened to blow up a Pakistan International Airways Airliner if it was not loaded with 20 tons of medical supplies for East Pakistani refugees.

Anti-gang squad members, disguised as airport workers, were able to slip on board and overpower him after a long siege.

Ever since hijacking became a regular world occurrence, France has been thinking of forming special squads to combat such incidents.

CODED

CABLEGRAM

NITEL

TO LEGAT PARIS

1 - Mr. D. Callahan
11/21/72

FROM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI
W. MARK FELT
ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO MEETING ON TERRORISM-LIAISON MATTER

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. Smith
1 - Mr. H. A. Boynton Jr.
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

AMBASSADOR ARMIN HENRY MEYER, SECRETARY TO THE CABINET COMMITTEE
TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND CHAIRMAN OF ITS WORKING GROUP, WILL MEET WITH
NATO REPRESENTATIVES ON DECEMBER ONE THREE AND ONE FOUR, NEXT, IN
BRUSSELS. LEGAT, PARIS SHOULD PLAN TO BE IN BRUSSELS DURING THIS
PERIOD EVEN THOUGH ASSISTANT LEGAT MAY BE ABSENT DUE TO RELIEF DUTY
IN SPAIN.

b6
b7C

AMBASSADOR MEYER IS AWARE THAT LEGAT IS CURRENTLY CHAIRMAN OF THE
NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND DESIRES TO DISCUSS WITH HIM PROCEDURES
WHEREBY THE UNITED STATES CAN SECURE MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THE NATO
COUNTRIES IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. HE IS PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN IDENTIFYING ANY WEAK AREAS WHICH COULD BE STRENGTHENED
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. A COPY OF THE PRO-
POSED AGENDA FOR AMBASSADOR MEYER'S MEETING IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU

GAD:ems
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 27 1972

TELETYPE

58 DEC 6 1972

ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ST-103

REC-63

10/21/72

62-115360-18

25 NOV 28 1972

Cablegram to Paris
Re: Nato Meeting On Terrorism

BY AIR MAIL. THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN MOST COOPERATIVE WITH THE BUREAU
IN CONNECTION WITH PROBLEMS INVOLVING ARAB TERRORISM AND IT IS DESIRED
THAT YOU BE OF ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE TO HIM.

NOTE:

Acting Director Gray is a member of the Cabinet Committee
itself and Mr. E. S. Miller is a member of the working group.
Ambassador Meyer has specifically requested the cooperation outlined
above. We see no problem with Legat being away from his office
one or two days even though assistant Legat is absent as he has three
well trained and experienced girls who can handle routine matters and
reach him by telephone in an emergency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

CONFIDENTIAL
DATE: 11/17/72

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-14-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 11-14-2030

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
rmstrong _____
lerwig _____
Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary in
this matter are the following revised pages and one new page:

Pages

✓19d
✓23e2
✓23f
✓23h
✓23i
✓24
✓28
✓29

Revised
Revised
Revised
Revised
New
Revised
Revised
Revised

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Enclosures

LEB:bak
(5)

7-ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC-73

CONTINUED - OVER

DEC 1 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

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b1

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CLASSIFIED BY 1482 JGM/ab
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] (C)

(5) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] personages, reportedly enroute to the
U. S. in September, 1972, were sighted in the Middle East
during the week of 10/20/72.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] (C)

(7) [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was granted a U. S. visa.
He arrived in the U. S. on 11/10/72 and has been afforded
intensive coverage by us.

(C)

ACTION:

The enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's
summary.

187

DEM

EM

DMK

7

G
11-29
10:17A

New + Revised
pages inserted
& old pages attached
hereto
edm
11/30/72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh



293
llb

62-115360-19

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

between his statement that he visited his sister in Belle Glade in June, July, 1972, and her statement that she has seen none of her brothers since she left Jordan in 1965

In connection with the Brazilian detention of [redacted] it is to be noted that on November 3, 1972, [redacted] New Orleans, Louisiana, advised our New Orleans Office that he was in receipt of information from sensitive and extremely reliable sources that unspecified terrorist activities would be directed against Brazilian diplomatic establishments and/or Brazilian officials in the United States in the near future. [redacted] added that the possibility exists that terrorist activities would utilize the mails and he requested Postal Service be notified without disclosing the source. [redacted] stated he had furnished the information to make it an official matter of record at the request of the [redacted] and in the name of the [redacted] in New Orleans. He said that he was not free to divulge further information in view of possible diplomatic repercussions and in view of the nature of the sources involved.

b6
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b7D

We have notified The White House and all other interested U. S. agencies including the Postal Service. Recon- tact will be made with [redacted] for any available additional information he may gain from his sources.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Our Legat at Beirut reported the following information concerning two letter bombs which exploded there October 25, 1972. No one was killed but two persons were injured seriously and may lose their sight. Both letter bombs were believed to have been mailed locally. One exploded at the main post office where it was being handled by a postal clerk. It was addressed to one [redacted] but the clerk could not recall the address. The other exploded when it was opened by a secretary at the Universal Trading Company, Cofinor Building, Beirut. It was addressed to [redacted] a [redacted] who is of Palestinian origin and has been active in Fatah. We disseminated the information developed by our Legat to the White House, State Department, military intelligence, and other appropriate agencies.

b6
b7C

Our Legat at Tel Aviv reported the following information received October 25, 1972, from the [redacted] concerning letter bombs addressed to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Secretary of State Rogers. The letter bombs were intercepted by Israeli postal employees, October 24, 1972, at a small village on the Lebanese border.

b7D

Two letters had been deposited in one letter box and a third letter in another. The letters were described as similar to those which had been mailed from Amsterdam. Addresses were typed on labels with no return address used and Israeli postage was affixed to each. The letters bore the numbers 42, 43, and 47 respectively, but the significance of the numbers was not known. We immediately advised the White House, Defense Department, CIA, and other interested agencies by teletype.

As of October 28, 1972, [redacted] investigation of the three letter bombs had developed no suspects. Worldwide press reports, however, linked them with the arrest of [redacted] a 20-year-old native born U. S. citizen. [redacted] advised, however, [redacted] had been arrested October 25, 1972, by an Israeli Defense Forces patrol when he attempted to cross the border into Lebanon. He was charged with a violation of the Israeli law "criminal infiltration."

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation of the offense determined [redacted] had been residing with relatives in Jerusalem. Upon interview of them, [redacted] found a supply of envelopes belonging to [redacted] similar in type to those used in the letter bombs intercepted at the Israeli-Lebanese border. [redacted] advised on October 29, 1972, that [redacted] was still being detained for investigation of his attempt to cross the border and that circumstances of the violation in relation to the time and place of the interception of the letter bombs would require some investigation of him in relation to the letter bombs. [redacted] noted, however, that a latent fingerprint found on one of the letter bombs was determined not to be identical with Feinsteins fingerprints.

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b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In the three-eighths inch gap was positioned a brass square-shaped body approximately two and one-half inches long by one-fourth by one-fourth inch recessed at the top and fitted with a release lever of similar metal approximately three-fourths inch by three-sixteenths inch tapering down to a point. The lever was secured to the main body by a small metal pin. This sleeve housed an approximate two-inch spiral spring and a blunt-nosed metal copper/steel type or brass striker notched out at the top to receive the release pin. The detonator was approximately one and three-fourths inches long by one-half inch diameter which was partly flattened. This detonator case was copper, and pressed indicating possible squeezing by use of a vise. The above items were covered by a piece of cardboard measuring out three and one-half by one inch.

We have furnished information concerning the mailings of letter bombs above to The White House and all interested U. S. agencies. We are contacting the intended victims and apprising them of attempts to mail letter bombs to them.

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(S) b1

b1

(S)

Additionally, our New York and Alexandria Special Agents are conducting appropriate immediate investigations at logical ports of entry to verify arrival of these individuals. Our Legal Attaches have been directed to determine if U. S. visas have been issued to these men.

10/4/72

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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(S)

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b1

(S)

Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C. W. Bates
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Ms. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/3/72

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 Sgm/10B
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

Reference is made to a memorandum from W. O. Cregar to E. S. Miller dated 10/30/72 captioned as above wherein it was noted that the Domestic Intelligence Division was preparing guidelines to be used by each field office in the preparation of contingency plans to meet a terrorist act against a diplomatic establishment or personage. Guidelines with cover airtel containing instructions and training material attached for the Acting Director's approval. (U)

Upon passage of new legislation "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States," it was necessary to draw up guidelines to assist the field in making comprehensive and workable contingency plans covering mobilization of FBI forces to combat a terrorist act covered by the statute. The guidelines, as prepared, require each office to record with certainty the chain of command, communications network, manpower both FBI and of cooperative agencies, equipment available, existing diplomatic establishments and liaison requirements to be committed by that office to meet any emergency posed by a terrorist act occurring within their territory. The cover airtel contains instructions concerning manpower assignments, contacts with local agencies, ordnance and protective gear and cautionary instructions relative to contacts with diplomatic establishments when authorized. Enclosed with the airtel is some training material containing some scenarios of terrorist acts which is to be used by each office to train its personnel. (U)

In order to assure that the contingency plans are prepared by the field and submitted to the Bureau for review without undue delay, deadlines for all offices, except New York and Washington Field are set for ten days after receipt of the guidelines. A deadline of 21 days after receipt of the guidelines is being set for New York and Washington Field in view of the heavy concentration of diplomatic establishments in their territories. (U)

Enclosures
LEB:bak (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

51 DEC 18 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION:

If approved, the attached guidelines and cover
airtel will be sent to all offices.

LE

~~JAT/WEB/MD~~
EM

ROU
WGC CMB. HKS *BRK*

Approved.

J...
12/15
8:21 P

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM :



TJS b6
b7C

SUBJECT: **CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM**

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
DATE: 12/5/72
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan



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b7C

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. ☒
Rutvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Attached for approval is paper captioned "Yugoslav Emigre Terrorism in the United States" dated 12/6/72.

Ambassador Armin Meyer, U. S. Department of State, chairman of Working Group of captioned committee, has requested above paper be prepared for the Working Group.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of attached paper will be disseminated to members of Working Group at next meeting, 12/6/72.

Enclosure

EWL:lkmm
(6) *lkmm*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

REC-48

ST 101

DEC 2 2 55 PM '72

15 DEC 7 1972

FOI-INDICE
REC'D F2 WITTED

80 DEC 15 1972
ENCLOSURE

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YUGOSLAV EMIGRE TERRORISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 6, 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-04-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

EM

DEC 2 2 55 PM '72

FBI-LOS ANGELES
REC'D '3' WITTEB

SEE NOTE - PAGE FOUR

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO
YOUR AGENCY: IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED
OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY NOR DUPLICATED WITHIN YOUR AGENCY.

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-21

YUGOSLAV EMIGRE TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

INTRODUCTION

This paper is a brief outline of Yugoslav emigre activities in the U. S. in relation to their potential for violence and terrorism against Yugoslav diplomatic establishments and individuals in the United States. As such, this document should not be construed as a definitive, detailed or comprehensive overview of what is, in fact, a very complex problem. The objective of the paper is merely to present the overall terroristic potential of these groups in the context of the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States (Public Law 92-539).

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DATE 05-04-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

The modern Yugoslav nation was created in the aftermath of World War I by collecting a group of separate ethnic populations in the Balkan area into one political entity. The diversity of cultures, languages and ethnic origins resulted in a nation whose political stability was often threatened. During World War II this situation was further exacerbated by conflict both against the occupying German forces as well as among the various ethnic and political factions which comprised the underground resistance. Russian occupation and domination followed World War II and resulted in a communist government led by Tito which ensued until 1948 when he disassociated Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc and set a separate course, still dedicated to communism. As a result of these internal upheavals a great number of Yugoslavs did not return to their country after World War II and others subsequently escaped as refugees to the western world.

There are a number of Yugoslav emigre organizations in the United States, primarily Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian in ethnic character. In general the emigre community is anti-Tito, although the diversity of ethnic factors noted above limits organizational cooperation and unity among these groups. The most active and potentially dangerous from a terroristic point of view are the individuals and organizations within the Serbian and Croatian factions.

Outside the United States, primarily in Europe, recent history has recorded numerous instances of terrorism, including assassinations of Yugoslav officials. In apparent retaliation several emigre leaders in Europe have been assassinated.

In the United States anti-Tito activity has generally been marked by propaganda generated by the emigre organizations and demonstrations against Yugoslav diplomatic establishments and individuals. For the most part these activities have not resulted in significant violence. However, from the period 1962 through 1966 incidents involving violence and terrorism did occur which included assault and intimidation of Yugoslav officials and Molotov cocktails and various missiles thrown at Yugoslav establishments. Such incidents were primarily in violation of local laws and within the jurisdiction of local authorities, although the FBI was in a position during this period to furnish advance intelligence information to local authorities which deterred, or greatly minimized the effect of, this violence.

On the morning of January 29, 1967, bombings occurred within a one-hour period at the Yugoslav Embassies in Washington, D. C., and Ottawa, Canada, as well as the Yugoslav Consulates in New York City, Chicago, San Francisco and Toronto, Canada. Based on the apparent interstate transportation

of explosives, FBI jurisdiction was established in this case and an intensive investigation was instituted. As a result of this investigation the FBI identified some 13 individuals who were involved in a conspiracy to carry out the bombings. All of these individuals were members of the Serbian emigre community. During grand jury proceedings in this matter contempt and perjury convictions were obtained against two conspirators. Due to lack of evidence no other prosecutive action has been possible. A key informant, developed during the investigation, furnished a great deal of information involving the suspects in the conspiracy and the bombings but, in fear of his life, could not testify.

As a result of long FBI involvement in investigations in the Yugoslav emigre community, particularly as a result of the 1967 bombing investigations, the FBI has developed numerous sources and informants in a position to furnish considerable intelligence information concerning the activities and intentions of the various violence-prone organizations and individuals among the emigre groups. During November, 1972, information was developed concerning demonstrations planned by Croatian elements during the weekend of December 2-3, 1972, against Yugoslav diplomatic establishments in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Pittsburgh in the United States as well as Vancouver, Hamilton and Toronto in Canada. These demonstrations were to commemorate the anniversary of student uprisings in Zagreb (capital of Croatia) during December, 1971, which were in the cause of Croatian nationalism and in protest against the Tito regime's alleged discrimination against the Croatian minority in Yugoslavia. These uprisings drew severe reprisals from Yugoslav authorities.

In view of the militancy of similar past demonstrations in the United States and the potential for violence and terrorism represented by these demonstrations, the FBI on November 30 and December 1, 1972, conducted extensive interviews among involved Croatian emigre leaders in the United States. During these interviews the provisions of Public Law 92-539, enacted October 24, 1972, were carefully explained. The purpose of these interviews was to act as a deterrent to any unlawful acts which might be committed during or incident to the upcoming demonstrations. It was also clearly explained during these interviews that there was no intent on the part of the FBI or the U. S. Government to inhibit lawful activities guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution. Pertinent information developed concerning the intended Canadian demonstrations was disseminated to appropriate Canadian authorities.

On December 2, 1972, demonstrations occurred in the vicinity of the Yugoslav Consulates located in Chicago and San Francisco. About 50 to 100 persons were involved in the Chicago demonstration and about 60 persons at San Francisco. On December 3, 1972, a motorcade of 70 cars formed on the west side of Manhattan in New York City and proceeded to the United Nations Plaza where 200 to 250 individuals engaged in a demonstration. All three demonstrations were peaceful in nature and involved no incidents nor were any arrests necessary. It would appear that the FBI interviews of emigre leaders had the desired effect.

The history of the anti-Tito emigre groups demonstrates their capacity for violence and terrorism--vividly illustrated by worldwide acts involving kidnappings, bombings and assassinations. While the U. S. has been relatively free of the more violent manifestations, there have been significant acts of harassment and terrorism which clearly indicate that the potential for future actions involving violations of Public Law 92-539 are present. To meet this problem the FBI will continue to develop intelligence information in this area in order to be in a position to predict, forestall and investigate all actions which might develop within the purview of Public Law 92-539.

NOTE:

See memorandum [redacted] to Mr. E. S. Miller, 12/5/72, captioned "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism," prepared by EWL:lkm.,

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FTB027 2:30 PM 11-30-72 GXC

NOV 30 1972

TELETYPE

STATE 135

4:10 PM URGENT 11/30/72

TO ACTING DIRECTOR NR325-30

FROM LEGAT PARIS (66-125) 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Kinney
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

~~NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION~~

NATO MEETING ON TERRORISM, LIAISON MATTER.

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM
REBUCAB NOVEMBER TWENTYSEVEN LAST, PARCAB NOVEMBER TWENTYEIGHT

LAST.

THE FOLLOWING IS BEING SUBMITTED FOR BUREAU CONSIDERATION AND
IN CONNECTION WITH CONTACTS WITH AMBASSADOR MEYER IN CAPTIONED
PROJECT.

THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT
IN INFORMAL SESSION AND IT IS ON AGENDA OF FORMAL SESSION FOR NEXT
MEETING. SUGGEST BUREAU PROPOSE BY MEMO TO SECRETARY THAT IT BE
MORE CLEARLY DEFINED FOR NEXT FORMAL MEETING AND THAT EACH COUNTRY
SUBMIT CONTRIBUTIONS SHOWING EXTENT OF PROBLEM AND WHAT COUNTER
MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN.

REC-21

62-115360

ST-111

SUGGEST AMBASSADOR MEYER THEN VISIT EACH NATO COUNTRY TO DISCUSS
ON POLITICAL LEVEL AND ALSO ON POLICE AND SECURITY LEVEL TO STRESS
IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT.

WEAK SPOTS APPEAR TO BE:

1. COMPLETE LACK OF COOPERATION BY ARAB NATIONS.

END PAGE ONE

SUMMARY FURNISHED
AMBASSADOR MEYER, STATE,
12/1/72 BOR

Mr. Felt
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller

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Bucab 12/4/72
GAD-11FC

PAGE TWO

2. INABILITY OF POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES TO PENETRATE ARAB TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS BLACK SEPTEMBER BECAUSE OF VAGUE NATURE OF ORGANIZATION AND SINCE IT IS AN ARAB GROUP.

3. INEFFECTIVE DECISIONS OF SOME COUNTRIES ON A POLITICAL LEVEL.

AMBASSADOR MEYER MAY WISH APPROACH ARAB NATIONS EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY TO ENLIST THEIR COOPERATION TO COMBAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND IN ABSENCE OF COOPERATION THE WESTERN COUNTRIES COULD PLACE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON ARAB RESIDENTS TO BRING THEIR COUNTRIES TO COOPERATION WITH THE CIVILIZED WORLD.

THE PENETRATION OF ARAB GROUPS IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH IS ALREADY BEING APPROACHED BY POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES. SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE AND GERMANY HAVE TAKEN A VERY SERIOUS APPROACH AND ARE TAKING ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO COMBAT THE PROBLEM.

AN EXAMPLE OF A WEAK STAND BY A FRIENDLY WESTERN COUNTRY WAS THE LACK OF ACTION BY HOLLAND IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARREST OF AN "ALGERIAN DIPLOMAT" AT SCHIPOHL AIRPORT IN AMSTERDAM, OCTOBER TWENTYTHREE LAST WITH SEVERAL SUITCASES CONTAINING NINETEEN LETTER LETTER BOMBS AND SEVEN KILOS OF EXPLOSIVES AND DETONATORS. ANOTHER SUITCASE CONTAINED A NUMBER OF ARMS AND DOCUMENTS IN ARABIC. AFTER AN UNSUCCESSFUL INTERROGATION OF THE SUBJECT AND AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE DUTCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HE WAS RELEASED BECAUSE

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SUITCASES COULD NOT BE PROVEN AND BECAUSE THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH TO PROVOKE A DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT WITH THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ENROUTE FROM BEIRUT TO BRAZIL WHERE HE CLAIMED TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE ALGERIAN MISSION. HE WAS EXPELLED FROM HOLLAND AND ADVISED HE WOULD PROCEED TO FRANKFURT AND THEN TO ALGIERS BUT INSTEAD FLEW FROM FRANKFURT TO RIO. IT IS BELIEVED HIS ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT WAS FALSE AND HAD HE BEEN DETAINED AND PROSECUTED POSSIBLY CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED REGARDING THE OPERATIONS OF THE BLACK SEPTEMBER GROUP.

THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN ON A POLITICAL LEVEL DESPITE OBJECTIONS OF POLICE AND THUS IT APPEARS EDUCATION AND PRESSURE ON THAT LEVEL ARE NECESSARY IN ADDITION TO FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE ENFORCEMENT LEVEL.

END

LXS JB
CC + 3rd cc : Mr. Boynton

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DC-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. FEELT _____
MR. BAKER _____
MR. BATES _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. DALBEY _____
MR. JENKINS _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E.S. _____
MR. PONDER _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____

September 29, 1972
1:00 PM

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[redacted] in Secretary of State WILLIAM
P. ROGERS' office called.

She stated that the Secretary wondered
if Mr. Gray or Mr. Miller would want
to give a 5-minute report on terrorism
as it concerns the FBI at the meeting
in Mr. Rogers' office Monday.

She would like to get a response back
on this as soon as possible, and she
was advised that Mr. Gray was presently out
of the building, but she would be advised as soon
as possible. (Code 101, extension 29572)

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Yes. - Mr. Gray
ST-110

REC-63

1 - Tele Room

edm

NOV 28 1972

59 DEC 14 1972

1047

*Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism*

FBI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7
12-7
10:06A

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

December 5, 1972

Mr. Felt	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Baker	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Callahan	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Cleveland	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Conrad	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Dalbey	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Gebhardt	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Jenkins	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Marshall	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Miller	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Purvis	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Soyars	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Walters	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Kinley	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. Armstrong	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ms. Herwig	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mrs. Neenan	<input type="checkbox"/>

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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sent
MEMORANDUM FOR

CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: */* Action to Combat Terrorism

I wish to commend you and those who serve on your Cabinet Committee for the excellent work you are doing in our campaign against politically inspired international terrorism. Although significant progress has been made, we must continue our efforts, in consultation with other governments, not only to prevent acts of terrorism but also to deal with them swiftly and effectively should they occur.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to members of your Cabinet Committee so that they in turn may thank their staffs for assisting in our efforts to eliminate the threat of terrorism throughout the world.

[Signature]

REC 43

62-115560-24

1 JAN 26 1973

5-TJS

ST-103

EXP. PROC.
DEC 5 1972

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FEB 2 1973 *1/150*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-14-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: December 6, 1972

FROM : E. S. MILLER

SUBJECT: HOSTILE ACTIVITIES AGAINST
YUGOSLAV ESTABLISHMENTS AND
PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - YUGOSLAVIA

CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Over the weekend of December 2-3, 1972, Croatian elements in the United States called for widespread demonstrations against Yugoslav establishments to commemorate student uprisings in Croatia Yugoslavia during December, 1971, which were sharply put down by the Tito Government.

Acting on advance knowledge of the planned demonstrations, Bureau Agents explained provisions of Public Law 92-539, the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, to leaders of the Croatian communities.

On December 6, 1972, Ambassador Armin Meyer, Secretary of the ~~Cabinet Committee on Terrorism~~, told the working group of the committee that the Yugoslav Government had expressed their gratitude for the manner by which U. S. authorities had handled the demonstrations of December 2-3, 1972. The Yugoslav Government, which previously had complained on numerous occasions about the lack of activity to protect Yugoslav representatives, noted that the action of the last weekend was in keeping with the harmonious relations that their Government desired to have with the Government of the United States.

Attached is a Bureau paper captioned, "Yugoslav Emigre Terrorism in the United States," which was furnished to the working group of the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism.

ACTION:

This is submitted for your information.

Enclosure

WAB:hke
(5)

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. W. A. Branigan

1-
1-

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515-119149
JAN 2 1973

NOT RECORDED
136 DEC 21 1972

DEC 18 1972

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-119149-1129

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ESPIONAGE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: March 12, 1973

FROM : E. S. Miller *ESM*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Secretary Rogers has postponed indefinitely the 3/13/73 meeting of captioned committee.

At 3:15 p.m., this date, Ambassador Armin Meyer telephonically advised that Secretary Rogers had postponed the above meeting due to the fact that he was having difficulty with scheduling and since Cabinet officers and other important committee members such as Mr. Gray had other commitments.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-16-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

ACTION:

For information.

ESM:lm1 *lm1*

(9)

- 1 - Mrs. Neenan
- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
- 1 -
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

b6

b7C

WGL

D. A.

DRK

Mr. Felt ☒
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ☒
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

EX-104
REC-48

62-11536025

21 MAR 14 1973

57 MAR 20 1973

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-16-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : [REDACTED] TJS

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SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 11/14/72

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr. Dalbey

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - [REDACTED]

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Bishop	_____
Callahan	_____
Cleveland	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Gebhardt	_____
Jenkins	_____
Marshall	_____
Miller, E.S.	_____
Purvis	_____
Soyars	_____
Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Kinley	_____
Mr. Armstrong	_____
Ms. Herwig	_____
Mrs. Neenan	_____

[REDACTED] to Miller memo 10/25/72, captioned "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States," related to language contained in a draft proposal of a "Memorandum for All Executive Departments and Agencies" which would assign responsibility for handling a terrorist attack in the U. S. Due to objections raised by Department of Defense and suggestions of the Department of Justice, substitute language was worked out and furnished to the subcommittee of captioned Committee, subject to the Acting Director's final approval. Subsequently, a much shorter version was proposed which would still give the FBI primary responsibility. However, at subcommittee meeting 11/9/72, Treasury Department passed out a paper which would in effect place Treasury in charge of situations where they already are affording protection. Copy of that paper is attached. This position must be rebutted at the next meeting scheduled 11/15/72 as being unacceptable to the FBI.

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The very first position taken by this Committee is that in the event of a terrorist attack in the U.S. the FBI will assume investigative responsibility. Up to 11/9/72 no one had questioned that point. Questions raised had to do with possible confusion or misunderstanding of the word "command" if military troops were used, and adherence to the concept that the FBI operates under overall supervision and direction of the Attorney General. Now, however, as can be seen from the attached Treasury Department memorandum, Treasury is advocating it maintain responsibility for response and action from the initial act by the terrorist until the act has become static.

Actually, the Treasury memorandum is a subtle attempt to override the initial concept of the Committee that the FBI will assume responsibility. In essence, it takes the stance that since an Executive Protective Service (EPS) officer, Secret Service agent, or local police

Enclosures

5 8 FEB 7 1973
TJS:bjr

(6)

62-11536 CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED
170 FEB 5 1973

SEE ADDENDUM P. 5

25 JAN 26 1973

RESEARCH SECTION

ORIGINAL FILED IN 165-00-62

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

officer will be on hand, such officer or agent must respond based on training and experience. This is understandable; the FBI will certainly not have someone on hand in a protective role. However, the Treasury proposal would have the responding officer continuing his response throughout the first phase of any act of terrorism and would continue until such time as the terrorist act is either thwarted or successful. In other words, the Treasury man would take charge at the minute the act began to occur and would continue in charge until the act was thwarted or successful. Treasury affords no recognition that the FBI would take charge upon its arrival at the scene. Apparently this position is based on the idea that protection is a statutory responsibility of Treasury and, therefore, remains so as long as the protective responsibility is required, notwithstanding the fact that a terrorist act is in progress or has been committed. It is to be noted that the FBI would not have operational responsibility during the so-called "Phase I - Initial Response Stage."

Under the "Phase II - Negotiations Stage" the Treasury memo notes that the FBI should assume investigative and command responsibility as soon as practical after notification of the initial response in Phase I. However, this same notation goes on to declare that other Federal and local law enforcement agencies should continue to carry out their statutory responsibilities with full cooperation extended to the FBI. In other words, the FBI can finally take charge but other agencies, presumably Treasury included, would carry out their statutory responsibilities. This does not sound as if the FBI is taking charge.

Finally, the Treasury memo, under "Phase III - Action Plan Stage," would have the FBI being ultimately responsible for the Action Plan after consultation with other appropriate law enforcement agencies.

It can readily be seen from the above that Treasury is bound and determined to undermine the FBI's position of position and authority relative to the commission of terrorist acts. We have previously pointed

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

out the fact that Treasury continues to encroach on FBI jurisdiction. This seems to be yet another example of such encroachment. We certainly stand ready to cooperate with Treasury in every way possible relative to the commission of a terrorist attack on an individual or establishment under Treasury's protection. Every agency of the Government must stand shoulder-to-shoulder in a solid front to meet the terrorist attack. We must consult with one another and cooperate with one another to the fullest extent possible. But we must acknowledge that in a time of crisis, such as a terrorist attack, there can only be one agency in charge. The FBI has been designated that agency and we have accepted the responsibility. The others must now accept their subordinate role.

It is also noted that under "Phase II - Negotiations" the Treasury memo refers to high level intergovernmental negotiations based on policy flowing from the Working Group. Under this concept the Working Group would make recommendations for negotiating (with the terrorists) to three individuals who would have negotiating authority: 1) A previously designated official in the White House; 2) The Secretary of State; and 3) The Attorney General. This is obviously an extremely cumbersome and unworkable plan. In a time such as this there can be only one decision maker. Whether he be Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General or the Acting Director of the FBI, sole responsibility must be vested in one man to make the decision.

To have the Working Group be a focal point for the operation would result in a bottleneck and to have the decision making then vested in a troika of three officials would further compound the problem. While obviously the Working Group should make recommendations to the decision maker, along with others involved in the problem, there should be no impeding of decision-making processes by having policy flowing through the Working Group or for that matter through any group of individuals. Input of information must be direct to the decision maker.

CONTINUED - OVER


Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

With the Acting Director's concurrence, we will take the position at the next subcommittee meeting scheduled for 11/15/72 that the concept advanced in the Treasury memorandum passed out at the past meeting is in opposition to the previously adopted position of the Committee that the FBI will immediately assume sole investigative jurisdiction and responsibility in the event of a terrorist attack. We will point out that irrespective of Treasury Department's protective responsibility the FBI will assume full responsibility and jurisdiction upon arrival at the scene of a terrorist attack and the ranking FBI official will be in charge. We will explain that the FBI requests the full and complete cooperation of all other agencies, both local and Federal, and will consult with such other agencies to the extent practicable, but that the FBI must reserve the right of making operational decisions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the subcommittee be informed at the next scheduled meeting that the FBI opposes any concept which does not clearly show that the FBI immediately assumes full operational jurisdiction and responsibility in the event of a terrorist attack in the U.S. in line with the previously adopted position of the Committee.

DBF *WJ* *RA* *EM* *HAS*



CONTINUED - OVER

RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ADDENDUM BY OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, 11/15/72, DJD:mfd. *mfd*

I favor the Treasury draft. It seems to me to take a common sense position that the FBI will handle all of the big investigations and that someone else will handle everything preliminary thereto. I think this is the proper arrangement and that the Treasury draft sets the arrangements as well as can be in a situation in which two different jurisdictions - FBI and Treasury - must necessarily be made to harmonize.

[Signature]

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 11-16-72 LMW:crt

Mr. Miller advises that at the 11-15-72 meeting consideration of various proposed plans of action was deferred to a subsequent meeting. Insofar as adherence to FBI position is concerned, I concur with that the Treasury Plan is a common-sense position except that I believe it to be fuzzy on the question of command responsibility as events unfold during Phase I. At the bottom of page 2 and continuing to the top of page 3 of the Treasury proposal, it states "The complete command control at this time (initial response throughout Phase I) must be placed under the supervision of the highest ranking law enforcement officer on the scene." If there are several agencies on the scene with different methods of ranking their officers, this approach could lead to chaos. If this portion of the proposal, however, were amended to provide that the command responsibilities would remain under the control of the highest ranking officer of the agency providing the initial response (Federal, state or local) until arrival and assumption of command by the FBI--then, the entire draft would appear to be acceptable. It would provide us with command responsibility from the time we take over, whether that is during Phase I, II, or III.

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

DATE: 11/16/72

FROM : ^{On File} Daniel M. Armstrong, III

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-03-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____

Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Re memorandum [redacted] to Mr. E. S. Miller, 11/14/72,
captioned as above.

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[redacted] in oral conversation with me explained the position taken in his Addendum by saying that he interpreted the statement in the Treasury memorandum that the FBI should assume investigative and command responsibility as soon as practical after notification of the initial response in Phase I to mean that the FBI takes over as soon as it reaches the scene, regardless of whether Phase I or Phase II is then in existence. I agree with [redacted] that the Treasury memorandum can certainly be read this way. I do not conclude from the fact that the statement is made under the heading "Phase II" that Phase II must have come into existence in order for the statement to take effect.

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I agree with DID that a subsequent statement in the Treasury memorandum that the FBI is "ultimately responsible...after consultation with other appropriate Law Enforcement Agencies" could be inconsistent with the earlier statement that the FBI is to assume investigative and command responsibility. Further clarification of the phrase "consultation with other appropriate Law Enforcement Agencies" should be sought with a view towards indicating clearly that such consultation in no way limits the full investigative and command responsibility of the FBI once it has taken charge of the matter.

With respect to the additional concern of DID that other Federal and local law enforcement agencies are to "continue to carry out their statutory responsibilities," I do not think this statement necessarily is intended to undercut the grant of investigative and command responsibility to the FBI. "Statutory responsibilities" could be referring to nothing more than the fact that the Treasury will continue to carry out its statutory

DMA:nm (2)

1 - Mr. Armstrong

8 FEB 7 1973

ENCLOSURE

62-115360 -
NOT RECORDED
170 FEB 5 1973
JAN 26 1973

CONTINUED - OVER

RESEARCH SECTION

ORIGINAL FILED IN 185-00-1064

Memorandum for Mr. Gray
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

responsibilities to afford protection to various persons and property. I would agree with DID to the extent that the Treasury should be asked to be more specific as to what it means when it refers to the "statutory responsibilities" of other agencies.

With these exceptions, together with the suggestion of Mr. Felt per Mr. Walters, I believe that the Treasury plan is consistent with the FBI's legitimate desire to assume full operational jurisdiction and responsibility in the event of a terrorist attack in the United States.

BDK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CCCT, March 13, 1973

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11-08-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

II. Improvement of Security in the United States

A. Protection of Foreigners

1. Visiting Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, and Others Designated by the President

The personal protection afforded by the U. S. Secret Service to Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, and others designated by the President is authorized by proper legislation and is being implemented professionally.

2. Visiting Distinguished Foreign Visitors Other Than Those Listed in "A" Above

a. Problem:

At the present time there is confusion as to whether the U. S. Secret Service or the State Department Office of Security should provide this protection.

b. Solution:

It would be desirable to have legislation authorizing the manpower and funds necessary if this type of protection is to be provided. The legislation should also clarify agency responsibility.

3. Foreign Diplomatic Personnel Assigned in the United States

a. Problem:

Adequate protection is not now being provided. In the past even though the Department of State has received numerous requests to provide personal protection to foreign diplomatic personnel, in only two cases and for short durations, has State's Office of Security been able to provide personal protection to Ambassadors in Washington. In only

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ENCLOSURE

extreme cases have local police agencies provided personal protection in and out of Washington. In the event the CCCT desires that protection of this nature be provided, neither the Department of State Office of Security nor the U. S. Secret Service is funded or staffed to provide such protection.

b. Solution:

Option (1) Direct reimbursement to local police for the actual protection requested by the Department of State. This would require appropriation from Congress, definitive criteria for reimbursement and appropriate disbursing and audit procedures.

Option (2) Assignment of either U. S. Secret Service or State Department Office of Security personnel. This would require legislative clarification and adequate funds, manpower, training, and equipment to whichever agency this responsibility may be assigned.

4. Visiting Foreign Cultural Exchange Groups, Trade Missions, and International Conferees in the United States

a. Problem:

Adequate protection is not now being provided to these groups. Under a loose interpretation of the firearms legislation for the Department of State, certain groups have been afforded varying degrees of protection. In certain cases, the entire responsibility for the protection of such groups has fallen upon local law enforcement agencies. In cases where intelligence indicated the possibility of incidents, the Department of State assigned either observers or Liaison Officers with the visiting group. Full time Department of State Security Officers have been assigned to each visiting group from the People's Republic of China.

b. Solution:

Same solutions as proposed under 3 above.

B. Protection of Foreign Property**1. Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Establishments****In Washington, D. C.****a. Problem:**

Foreign diplomatic establishments within Washington, D. C., are not being provided adequate physical protection. The Executive Protection Service (EPS) was established to handle only foreign diplomatic establishments in the Washington, D. C. area. EPS' manpower is limited to 350 positions for foreign missions; however, 48 of these positions have not been funded by Congress.

b. Solution:

A preliminary estimate indicates that the EPS capability to provide protection for foreign diplomatic establishments in the Washington area should be increased by 250 funded positions, in addition to filling the existing 48 unfunded positions. (This would provide for an additional 25 fixed posts 24 hours a day, seven days a week, plus a small reserve to meet urgent State Department requests.) The estimated cost to provide an increase of 250 funded positions and to fill the existing 48 unfunded positions would be \$7,101,000 for the first year and \$5,400,000 for each following year on a recurring basis.

2. Protection of Foreign Missions to the United Nations in New York City**a. Problem:**

Foreign missions to the United Nations in New York City are not being provided adequate physical protection. The New York City Police Department responds to requests for physical protection only in the case of hard threats or violent acts. Fixed posts, which are kept to a minimum, have only been authorized with reluctance. When foreign missions are located on an upper floor, fixed posts are normally never authorized.

To provide full physical security protection, 158 fixed posts on a 24 hour basis plus 136 posts on a 12 hour basis would be required. This would require 1,723 EPS Officers. For partial coverage, a minimum of 214 EPS Officers would be required.

b. Solution:

Option (1) Reimburse the New York City Police Department for the actual cost of services requested. Based on past experience, the cost is estimated at \$2,000,000 plus for limited fixed post coverage, not including costs for special attention coverage.

Option (2) Expand the EPS to provide federal protection at an estimated cost of \$34,400,000 the first year and recurring annual costs of \$32,000,000 plus for full coverage requiring 1,723 EPS Officers or at an estimated cost of \$4,800,000 the first year and recurring annual costs of \$4,500,000 for partial coverage requiring 214 EPS Officers.

3. Protection of Consular Establishments

Outside of Washington, D. C.

a. Problem:

Consular establishments outside of Washington are not being protected by federal authority. Reasonably, consideration should be given to cities where there are three or more Consulates and assuming one fixed post per Consulate.

Eighteen cities in the United States have three or more consular establishments. In these eighteen cities, the consular establishments total 334. It is estimated that 2,700 EPS Officers plus 270 supporting U. S. Secret Service personnel would be required to furnish fixed post protection to these 334 consular establishments in eighteen cities.

b. Solution:

Option (1) Reimburse local law enforcement agencies for the actual costs of services requested. Based on New York City Police Department pay scales, the cost for fixed post protection at 334 Consular establishments in eighteen cities is estimated to be \$26,000,000 plus.

Option (2) Expand the EPS so as to provide federal protection. The cost for 2,700 EPS Officers plus 270 supporting U. S. Secret Service personnel in eighteen cities for 334 Consular establishments is estimated to be \$68,500,000 the first year with recurring annual costs of \$52,800,000 after the first year.

.. Option (3) Use of military forces, private security guard services, and grants through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). These alternatives offer little hope.

4. Protection of Foreign Quasi-Official Establishments

a. Problem:

There is no provision in law to provide this type of protection other than by local police. There has been great reluctance on the part of local police to provide protection to the Quasi-official establishments, e.g. Israeli Trade Mission in New York, Aeroflot, Amtorg, etc. Unless there is a definite hard threat, local police departments have refused to provide fixed post protection.

b. Solution:

Option (1) Reimburse local law enforcement agencies for the actual costs of services rendered when requested by the Department of State. This would require appropriation from Congress, definitive criteria for reimbursement, and appropriate disbursing and audit procedures.

Option (2) Expansion of EPS to provide protection to all foreign quasi-official establishments.

5. Protection of Foreign Commercial Establishments

a. Problem:

In the past when the Department has requested local police authority to provide protection for foreign commercial establishments, e. g. banks, the police have been extremely reluctant to do so except in cases where there are hard threats.

b. Solution:

These establishments are too numerous to be provided with federal protection. In those cases where the Department of State determines police protection should be provided, reimbursement for actual costs might be authorized from federal funds or appeals should be made to local police.

C. Implementation of PL 92-539

The "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States:" defines certain investigative and prosecutive responsibilities for acts committed against foreign officials or their family members in the United States or against official guests of the United States. This act does not provide for physical protection of diplomats or diplomatic establishments.

The FBI has exclusive investigative responsibility under this legislation. As a result of the increase in terrorist activities, it has been determined from careful and detailed surveys that an amount of \$5,304,298 is needed for additional training and the purchase of equipment to meet any contingency resulting from an act of terrorism perpetrated against a foreign official or foreign establishment in the United States.

Components of the \$5,304,298 are:

Training for 6 Firearms Instructors	\$120,000
Salaries for 2 Armorers, 1 Clerk, 5 Firearms Training Assistants	64,000
Cost of Crating and Shipping Equipment to Field Offices	40,000
Training and Transportation Costs for 220 Teams of 5 Agents at a Cost of \$240 per Agent	264,000
Mock City Complex	1,100,000
Equipment:	
Communications	1,548,900
Weapons	361,093
Vehicles	810,000
Body Armor	204,000
Ammunition	410,456
Gas Masks	66,950
Specialized Clothing	88,300
Miscellaneous	226,599
	<u>3,716,298</u>
	<u>5,304,298</u>

D. Financial Implications in Maintaining Tightened Visa, Immigration and Customs Procedures

1. Visa Procedures - (Operation Boulder and suspension of TRWOV)

Additional Personnel Required:

6 American Officers Overseas
27 Locals Overseas
7 American Officers Domestically
3 American Clerical Domestically

Cost: - FY '73 \$148,700
FY '74 \$420,000

2. Immigration Procedures - (Operation Boulder, Investigations and Interview Program)

Additional Personnel Required:

75 Investigators
25 Clerk/Stenos
6 Communications Personnel
6 Records Clerks

Cost: \$1,500,000 per fiscal year

3. Customs Procedures - (Operation Boulder and TRWOV)

Additional Personnel Required:

10 Inspectors
2 Administrative Support

Cost: \$240,000

4. Customs Procedures - (Special Activities)

Additional Personnel Required:

12 Inspectors to cover New York and Washington/Baltimore Areas (99% coverage)
4 Administrative Support

Cost: (Personnel) \$320,000
(Equipment) \$750,000

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9.

5. Customs Mail and Cargo Procedures -

(Intensive Examination)

Additional Personnel Required:

100 Inspectors, Patrol Officers and
Administrative Support

Cost:

\$1,500,000 per fiscal year

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

1 - Mr. Conrad

DATE: 8/12/73

1 - Mr. Gebhardt

1 - Mr. Jenkins

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Memorandum F. S. Putman to Mr. E. S. Miller,
3/8/73, advised that a meeting of the Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism (CCCT) was scheduled for 3 p.m., Tuesday,
3/13/73. The tentative agenda to be distributed by State
Department contains three items; 1. Political--Intelligence
(Will involve an oral presentation by representatives of
State Department and CIA as to what steps can be taken to
counter the Black September Organization (BSO)), 2. Improve-
ment of Protection in the U. S. (See attached draft),
3. Improvement of Security for Americans Abroad. (2) (U)

The attached draft entitled, "Improvement of
Security in the U. S." was prepared by representatives of
the Departments of State and Treasury, the Secret Service
and FBI at the request of Ambassador Armin Meyer, Chairman,
Working Group of the CCCT to be responsive to the President's
question, "What actions are being taken to protect foreign
officials in the U. S.?" The draft delineates problems and
suggests certain solutions in two areas of protective responsi-
bility assigned to either the Office of Security, U. S.
Department of State, the Secret Service or the Executive Pro-
tection Service (EPS). Specifically the draft addresses:
A. Protection of Foreigners and B. Protection of Foreign Property.
The fundamental problems outlined in the attached draft are:
1. Lack of clarity as to what department or agency has specific
protective jurisdiction and 2. Lack of adequate protection being
afforded foreign visitors and diplomatic personnel in the U. S.

The solutions developed in the attached draft are:
1. Immediate legislation to clarify the protective responsi-
bility of the Office of Security, U. S. Department of State,
and Secret Service; 2. Request for immediate legislation to
provide sufficient manpower and funds to provide the necessary
protection; 3. The direct reimbursement to local police

Enclosure

WOC:ehc
(8)

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Memorandum for Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

departments for actual protection requested by the Department of State and 4. The expansion of the EPS to provide adequate protection for diplomatic establishments in Washington, D. C. (S) (U)

Consideration was given to expand EPS outside of Washington, D. C., as well as the use of military forces, private security guard services and grants through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. It was felt these alternatives offer little hope. (U)

C. Implementation of Public Law 92-539. The attached draft points out that the "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the U. S." does not provide for physical protection of diplomats or diplomatic establishments. This language was intentionally incorporated into the paper to clarify the erroneous belief that this Act for which the FBI has exclusive investigative jurisdiction provides for physical protection. The only protection the Act provides for is the protection of the law. (S) (U)

On page 7 the draft delineates the need of the FBI for additional funds (\$5,304,297) for training and equipment. (U)

These figures were developed as a result of a detailed and extensive study undertaken by representatives of the Intelligence, Training, General Investigative and Laboratory Divisions in 2/73. The results of that study have been incorporated into a memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. E. S. Miller, entitled "Contingency Plans for Handling Terrorist Attacks," dated 3/9/73. This memorandum delineates the Bureau's needs with complete justification and recommends that the Administrative Division incorporate a request for this amount of money in a memorandum to the Attorney General. (U)

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Paragraph D, page 8 of the attached draft entitled "Financial Implications in Maintaining Tightened Visa, Immigration and Custom Procedures," itemizes the costs incurred by State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service and

Memorandum for Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the Bureau of Customs to implement procedures designed to prevent known terrorists illegally entering the U. S. Of particular note is that reference to paragraph 4 entitled, "Customs Procedures (Special Activities)." Special activities refer to the technical screening of diplomatic pouches entering the U. S. in the New York and Washington-Baltimore areas. No effort was made in this paper to address the legality of such screening. (C) (S) (U)

In preparing the attached draft for consideration by the CCCT drafters of the paper were unanimous in their opinion that 100 per cent protection of individuals and establishments could not be assured but that the degree of protection that could be provided is directly commensurate with the amount of men, money, training and equipment for this purpose. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Gray endorse the draft and concur in the suggested solutions at the time it is considered by the CCCT on Tuesday, 3/13/73. (U)

EM

I HAVE NOT YET SEEN
THE MEMO JUSTIFYING
THE # 5,304,297

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SSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 3/8/73

FROM : F. S. Putman

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CFB/ELH
ON 11-07-2006

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ☒
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

This memorandum advises that the Secretary of State, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT), plans to call a meeting of the Committee tentatively set for Tuesday, 3/13/73.

By memorandum 9/25/72 to the Secretary of State the President established the CCCT, membership to include the Acting Director of the FBI. Following the murder of the two State Department officials during the take-over of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the Sudan, the President asked the Secretary of State what actions are being taken to protect foreign officials in the U. S. (C)(U)

On 3/7/73 Ambassador Armin Meyer, Chairman, Working Group of the CCCT, advised that Secretary of State Rogers expects to call a meeting of the CCCT to address the President's inquiry. Tentative date for this meeting is Tuesday, 3/13/73. It is anticipated Secretary of State Rogers' office will contact members of the Committee to advise them of the specific time and date of the meeting. (U)

As a result of the President's question, Ambassador Meyer requested representatives of State Department, Treasury, Secret Service and FBI meet to develop a program to afford greater protection to foreign officials in the U. S. This group expects to have specific recommendations for consideration of the CCCT by Friday, 3/9/73. (U)

Recommendations of the group will be submitted to the Acting Director in memorandum form for his consideration prior to the meeting of the CCCT. (U)

ACTION:

For information.

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

FSP/WOC:ebc
(4)

54 MAR 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

22 MAR 15 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDENDUM:

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ESM:mcl

3/8/73

At approximately 6:00 p.m., 3/8/73. Ambassador Armin Meyer's secretary telephonically contacted [] to advise that the above-mentioned meeting of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism has been called by Secretary Rogers for 3:00 p.m., Tuesday, 3/13/73, in the Adams Room at the State Department. [] was advised that it would be appropriate for Mr. Gray to bring with him his alternate. It is noted that at the prior meeting of the Cabinet Committee Miller attended the meeting with Mr. Gray. (U)

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[] advised Ambassador Meyer's secretary that in all possibility Mr. Gray would be in attendance at the meeting unless there was some urgent conflict such as his being called back to the Senate for meetings with the Judiciary Committee studying his confirmation. (U)

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7 WGC EM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

- 1 - Mr. W. Mark Felt
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
- 1 - Mr. L. E. Belanger

DATE: 3/14/73

FROM : F. S. Putman

DATE: 02-16-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-16-2031

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

CLASSIFICATION PER OGA LETTER
DATED 02-28-2007

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E. S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosed for inclusion in Mr. Gray's summary
in this matter are the following revised and new pages:

Pages

7 Revised ✓
8 Revised ✓
10e New ✓
10f New ✓
13 Revised ✓
13a Deleted ✓
15c Revised ✓
23i Revised ✓
23j New ✓
23k New ✓
23l New ✓
26b New ✓
30 New ✓
31 New ✓
31a New ✓
31b; Appendix J New ✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The enclosed pages set forth the following:

(1) The current status of our investigation of
the Jewish Defense League (JDL) and [redacted]
[redacted] He is awaiting prosecution in Israel in connection
with a JDL plot to smuggle weapons out of Israel for use against
Arab terrorists in Europe and [redacted]

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b1

Enclosures - 28

HLD: jlr

(5)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"
CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee to
Combat Terrorism

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) An account of the murder of the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission, Khartoum, Sudan, by BSO terrorists, 3/3/73. (S) (u)

(4) By teletype 3/6/73, we instructed all SACs to immediately reinterview known or reported Fatah members. Purpose of the interviews is to deter any contemplated terrorist activity in the U.S. and to develop sources among any Fatah members who also share world opinion with respect to the repugnance of the murder of U.S. diplomatic representatives in Sudan. (S) (u)

(5) A summary [redacted] concerning letter bomb mailings prepared at the request of Ambassador Armin Meyer, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee working group for his use in connection with NATO consultations on terrorism. (u)

b1
(C)

(6) A summary of our investigations concerning reported Arab terrorist plots in Chicago, November, 1972, and against King Hussein of Jordan during his visit to the U.S. in February, 1973. (S) (u)

(7) A summary of our current investigation concerning attempted bombings of three locations in the vicinity of Israeli facilities, New York City, on 3/6/73, code name TRIBOM, and 13 photographs related thereto. (u)

ACTION:

The enclosed material is submitted to update Mr. Gray's summary. (u)

HLD
KSP
New + Revised
pages inserted
Old pages attached
here. edm
3-21-73

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WGC

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WPK

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DATE 02-16-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

ENCLOSURE

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BOORI

By teletype dated 10/4/72, we have alerted all our offices of the attempts by "The New York Times" to set up situations whereby our Agents will be observed and photographed in connection with our investigations of Arab terrorists. Instructions were given to immediately alert all Agents to this situation and to advise the Bureau if any reporters made any contact with our offices for information concerning our investigations of Arabs. It was instructed further that should any such inquiries be received, they were to be answered by "no comment."

We are furnishing results of interviews to interested Government agencies, particularly to Immigration and Naturalization Service when persons interviewed are aliens.

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DATE 05-04-2005 BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

A P P E N D I C E S

- Appendix A - Memorandum for The Secretary of State
from the President, September 25, 1972
"Action to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix B - Memorandum for the President
from The Secretary of State
September 18, 1972
"Measures to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix C - Memorandum for the President
from The Secretary of State
September 21, 1972
"Measures to Combat Terrorism"
- Appendix D - Photographs of Bomb Mailings
- Appendix E - Fedayeen Organizations
- Appendix F - FBI Special Study
September 15, 1972
"Arab Terrorist Activity in
the United States"
- Appendix G - Proposed Attorney General's answer to
FBI query regarding jurisdiction and
policy in the event of terrorist attacks
against foreign diplomatic establish-
ments in the U. S.
- Appendix H - House Resolution 15883
- Appendix I - FBI Alert for Hani Ahmed Said Al Hassan

10/1/72

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL)

JDL, organized in New York City in 1968 by Rabbi Meir D. Kahane as a self-defense group designed ostensibly for the protection of Jewish merchants and residents from the racial violence of the black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, is the most aggressive of the militant Jewish organizations operating in the United States. JDL has been under investigation by the FBI since shortly after the organization was formed.

JDL has been the focal point of numerous acts of terrorism and violence aimed primarily against Soviet establishments, personnel, and cultural exhibits in the United States. During the past year, JDL broadened its sphere of harassment to include other foreign establishments in the United States, such as Arab interests, which it considers to be aligned with or aiding the enemies of Jews. Top United States Government officials have demanded a "strong Federal presence" in neutralizing JDL terroristic actions. In June, 1972, four JDL members were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in New York City for their participation in two separate firebombings which occurred in New York City in January, 1972, and which were intensively investigated by the FBI. One of these firebombings resulted in a homicide, several injuries, and extensive property damage. It is anticipated that additional JDL members will be indicted in the same cases. The State of New York is prosecuting the homicide aspect involved. FGJs convened in New York City and in Los Angeles during May and June, 1972, for the purpose of looking into JDL. In this connection, Special Agents of our New York and Los Angeles Offices served subpoenas on numerous JDL members, and also conducted a penetrative interview program of these JDL members. Information developed from our investigations of JDL and its leaders and members has been promptly disseminated to all interested agencies.

In late August, 1972, Rabbi Kahane, International Director of JDL, announced at a press conference in Israel that JDL in the United States would kidnap and hold for ransom Soviet diplomats if the Soviet Union did not abandon its taxation of Jewish intellectuals who desired to emigrate from Russia to Israel. On Bureau instructions, Kahane was penetratively interviewed by our Legal Attache in Tel Aviv in conjunction with representatives of the Department of State. It is believed that this interview served as a deterrent to JDL plans to carry out its announced threats against Soviets.

On September 5, 1972, when it was reported that one member of the Israeli Olympic delegation was murdered by an Arab terrorist group in Munich, Germany, and in anticipation of additional violence, a teletype was dispatched to all Special Agents in Charge and Legal Attaches with instruction to target our sources to obtain additional information concerning contemplated reprisals by JDL against Arab interests.

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL) (CONTINUED)

Following the murders of the 11 Jewish Olympians in Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, JDL, Los Angeles, publicly announced it would retaliate against Arab terrorists in the United States. The Los Angeles Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) conducted surveillances of JDL members in Los Angeles. Subsequently, on September 12, 1972, the residence of an Arab in Los Angeles was bombed, resulting in property damage but no injuries. This bombing is under intensive investigation by our Los Angeles Office since it is believed to have been perpetrated by a terrorist group, JDL. The Internal Security Division of the Department has recommended to the Attorney General that a FGJ be convened in Los Angeles for the purpose of looking into that bombing, as well as into JDL and other bombings believed to have been committed previously by JDL. Results of our investigation are immediately furnished upon receipt to the Internal Security Division of the Department.

By letter dated September 15, 1972, we requested the Attorney General to restate the delineation of the separate jurisdiction of the FBI and ATF insofar as bombings and attempted bombings by terrorist groups, such as JDL, are concerned. We are awaiting the Attorney General's response to this request.

National membership of JDL is estimated to be 8 to 10 thousand.

The handling of the Bureau's investigation of JDL is receiving preferred supervision both at Headquarters and in the field.

Installation of the already authorized installations
is being accomplished as rapidly as cooperative telephone com-
pany facilities permit. (JUNE)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM/TJS*

FROM : Forrest S. Putman *FS*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

b6 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
b7C 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - [redacted]

DATE: 3/29/73

Mr. F.S. Putman

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY 1442 SGM/2J
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
pg 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

On 3/28/73, the working group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Armin Meyer at which time the attached memorandum prepared for the President was discussed. This memorandum pertains to Protection of Foreign Diplomats in the United States. *(u)*

Ambassador Meyer is desirous of obtaining the recommendations of each of the permanent members of the Cabinet Committee by 3/30/73 so that this memorandum may be placed in final form and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget and thence to the President. *(u)*

The attached memorandum pertains primarily to actual physical protection of foreign diplomats in the United States for which the FBI does not have any investigative responsibilities. These portions merely require a concurrence or disapproval on the part of Mr. Gray. Pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the attached memorandum set forth 2 possible means of solutions to actual physical protection of the Foreign Missions to the United Nations in New York City, and to Consular Establishments outside the Washington, D. C., area. These 2 situations require Mr. Gray's recommendations as to which proposal he would choose. In effect, the 2 proposals for both situations concern the expansion of the Executive Protective Service or utilization of local police departments with reimbursements being made to those departments for the actual costs. The consensus of the working group is that the best and most economical approach to these 2 situations could be afforded through local law enforcement with actual cost being reimbursed by the Government. *(u)*

ENCLOSURE

The FBI's responsibilities in connection with this paper pertains to our responsibilities in combating terrorism and implementing Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials). We have no responsibilities for actual physical protection of foreign diplomats but we do have investigative responsibilities should an attack be made on any

Enclosure
FSP:cae
(5)

SEE ADDENDUM, INSPECTION DIVISION, PAGE 3
SEE ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT PAGE 4.

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84 JUL 30 1974

Putman to E. S. Miller Memo
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

foreign official. The portion of this paper pertaining to the FBI is set forth on pages 11 and 12. This writeup needs to be altered slightly to also include our budgetary request in carrying out our responsibilities. The Office of Management and Budget has requested that our budgetary figures in this particular area be included in this paper to the President. Attached is a memorandum setting forth the final draft which the FBI would propose being placed in this final memorandum for the President. This new writeup sets forth a budgetary request for the FBI of \$7,336,548 for 100 additional Agents, additional equipment and training needed to carry out our investigative responsibilities under this new act. (U) (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) If Mr. Gray approves, the attached memorandum pertaining to the FBI's responsibilities will be furnished to Ambassador Meyer for inclusion in the final paper prepared for the President. (U)

(2) If Mr. Gray approves, and favors utilization of local police to handle physical protection as mentioned on pages 7 through 10, Ambassador Meyer will be advised of his decision in this area. Intelligence Division favors this method in view of cost, savings, and efficiency. (U)

(3) If Mr. Gray approves, Ambassador Meyer will be advised that the FBI favors the overall memorandum to be prepared for the President. (U)

DEM

EM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/29/73

LMW:ams

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It appears a commitment is being made here for the FBI to accept a new role in actively combating large-scale violence represented by "terrorist attacks." The thinking of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism is clearly expressed at the top of page 12 of the attachment--"There has been an increase in terrorist activities which has now touched the United States. These terrorist activities coupled with the added responsibilities levied against the FBI under PL 92-539 will require concrete and positive action on the part of the FBI to react swiftly and decisively to any hostage-type situation that might result. The sole responsibility of reacting to acts of terrorism is that of the FBI." (Underlining added.) I see we have proposed slightly different wording for the above paragraph but we do not thereby correct intentions and understandings. We must meet head-on the question of whether we accept the new role envisioned for the FBI to act in lieu of or in command of large-scale police and/or military units--a major change of direction of our historic role of an investigatory and intelligence-gathering agency. The question involved here is not unlike that contained in the anti-riot laws under which we have successfully resisted the role of large-scale paramilitary reaction to an ongoing riot; holding firm to our historic role of investigating apparent anti-riot law violations after the quelling of the actual riot by local or state police, National Guardsmen or military units. (u)

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The basic question involved here was explored at a special conference called by Mr. Felt 3/28/73 where it was concluded we must first decide in-house what our posture should be and then propose appropriate wording to the Attorney General, OMB and the White House for confirmation of our position re the manner of discharging basic FBI responsibility under PL 92-539 as well as under general acts of "terrorism" as they occur (with a clear delineation of what constitutes "acts of terrorism" and of the precise circumstances where under the FBI has primary command responsibility). (u)

Also of importance is our position in presenting to OMB and then to the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate a request for over seven million dollars of supplemental funds without a clear-cut delineation of our role spelled out in precise language such as would be contained in a Presidential Order. (u)

The question presented here has such a far-ranging impact on the future role of the FBI that we should not be stampeded into a "deadline" reply; our posture in the matter should be defined only after careful consideration of all facets by the Executives' Conference. (u)

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ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 3-30-73 WMF:cm

I see no objection to going ahead now with Miller's proposed budgetary estimate. (u)

I agree most heartily with Mr. Walters, et al, as set forth in the addendum that we must have a written directive. There is no question we would handle a terrorist takeover of an Embassy, but do we really have the responsibility and the authority to move into a Lod Airport type situation? We might if foreign directed terrorists are involved, but what if the perpetrators are domestic black militants? Such questions must be resolved by a written directive. (u) (u)

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DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

No Stampede.

1. PL 92-539 places exclusive investigative responsibility for this legislation in the hands of the FBI.

2. We shall have to renegotiate the provisions of the remainder of the TP6 at bottom of page 11 and top of page 12. We are not trained to assault, nor is any law enforcement agency. This is a matter for the Army or Marines.

3. So also language of Enclosure 2 will have to be renegotiated.

3:05P Jim 9/30

~~MR. FELT~~
MR. BAKER
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. CLEVELAND
MR. CONRAD
MR. GEBHARDT
MR. JENKINS
MR. MARSHALL
MR. MILLER
MR. SOYARS
MR. THOMPSON
MR. WALTERS
TELE. ROOM
MR. KINLEY
MR. ARMSTRONG
MR. BOWERS
MR. HERINGTON
MS. HERWIG
MR. MINTZ
MRS. NEENAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12/14/79 BY 9803 AOS/MS ENCLOSURE

2-115-360-28X

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

DATE: 4/20/73

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

The Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism met on 4/18/73, and the attached two documents were distributed.

mz
Any agency having any comments concerning the proposed legislation regarding protection of missions in the United States are to set forth their comments at the next meeting. A review of the information indicates no comments are required by the FBI as this pertains to other agency activities.

The report on hijackings will also be further discussed during the next meeting of the Working Group.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 03-08-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures

FSP:cae
(2) *[Signature]*

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EM
REC-10

62-115360-29
5- *[Signature]*
APR 26 1973

55 MAY 3 1973 *[Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 4/27/73

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr.

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

On 4/25/73, the working group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism met and the copy of the minutes along with an exchange of correspondence between Ambassador Meyer and [] and a plan of action outline as prepared by the U. S. Coast Guard were furnished and are attached.

b6

b7C

A review fails to disclose any FBI interest. *B1*

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 03-08-2006 BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

Enclosures

FSP:cae

(2)

EM

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4.
ENCLOSURE
BEHIND FILE

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